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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In certain situations, a civil or criminal defendant may enjoy a 
privilege against being haled into court and facing the burdens of 
litigation.  For example, in the civil context, a defendant may enjoy 
absolute, qualified, or sovereign immunity from suit,1 or the dispute at 
issue may be subject to an arbitration agreement that requires plaintiff to 
arbitrate, rather than litigate, the dispute.2  In the criminal context, a 
defendant may be protected from prosecution by the constitutional 
prohibition against double jeopardy.3  In all of these cases, however, 
whether the defendant is in fact privileged to avoid litigation may itself 
be in dispute.  Thus, a civil plaintiff or the government may sue or indict 
a defendant, believing that the defendant is not privileged to avoid the 
action.  The defendant, in turn, believing that it is privileged to avoid the 
action, may ask the court to recognize the claimed privilege and dismiss 
the suit against it.  If the defendant’s request is denied and the court 
finds that defendant is subject to suit, the litigation proceeds.  Clearly, 
the court’s finding that the defendant is indeed subject to suit is not a 
termination of the case on the merits.  In general, orders that do not 
terminate a case on the merits are not immediately appealable under the 
final judgment rule.4  Nevertheless, some orders rejecting a defendant’s 
 
 1. See, e.g., Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855, 860 (2009) (“[L]egislators have long 
enjoyed absolute immunity for their official actions . . . , the common law grant[s] immunity to 
judges and jurors acting within the scope of their duties, and . . . the law has also granted 
prosecutors absolute immunity from common-law tort actions.”) (internal quotations omitted); 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1945 (2009) (“[Q]ualified immunity . . . shields Government 
officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights.”) (internal quotations omitted); Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 129 S. 
Ct. 2183, 2186 (2009) (“Under the venerable principle of foreign sovereign immunity, foreign states 
are ordinarily immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States.”) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 2. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 3 (West 2010) (“If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the 
courts of the United States upon any issue referable to arbitration . . . the court in which such suit is 
pending . . . shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration 
has been had.”). 
 3. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 661 (1977) (“[The double jeopardy clause] is a 
guarantee against being twice put to trial for the same offense.”). 
 4. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (West 2010) (“The courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of 
appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States.”) (emphasis added); Lauro 
Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 497-98 (1989) (“Title 28 U.S.C. § 1291 provides for appeal to 
the courts of appeals only from ‘final decisions of the district courts of the United States.’  For 
purposes of § 1291, a final judgment is generally regarded as a decision by the district court that 
ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.”) 
(emphasis added, internal quotations omitted).  This article addresses only lawsuits brought in 
federal court. 
2
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claimed right to avoid suit are immediately appealable either expressly 
by statute or under the collateral order doctrine.5 
If such an appeal is taken, the question then arises whether the 
district court should proceed with litigation of the merits of the case 
pending interlocutory appeal of the issue of defendant’s amenability to 
suit.6  On the one hand, if litigation is not stayed pending the appeal and 
the district court was wrong about the defendant’s amenability to suit, 
the defendant will have been subjected to litigation that it was actually 
entitled to avoid.  On the other hand, if litigation is stayed pending the 
interlocutory appeal but the district court was correct that defendant was 
not privileged to avoid suit, the litigation, to which defendant is properly 
subject, was unnecessarily delayed.  The approaches of various courts 
have not been uniform as to whether the underlying merits litigation 
must or should be stayed pending interlocutory appeal in these 
circumstances.7 
The majority approach across contexts appears to be that, so long as 
the appeal is not frivolous, the district court may not proceed with the 
 
 5. See Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 350 (2006) (“On the immediately appealable side are 
orders rejecting absolute immunity and qualified immunity.  A State has the benefit of the 
[collateral order] doctrine to appeal a decision denying its claim to Eleventh Amendment immunity, 
and a criminal defendant may collaterally appeal an adverse ruling on a defense of double 
jeopardy.”); Princz v. Fed. Republic of Ger., 998 F.2d 1, 1 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“A district court’s 
denial of a foreign state’s motion to dismiss on grounds of sovereign immunity is immediately 
appealable.”); 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(A)-(C) (West 2010) (allowing immediate appeals of orders 
refusing to enforce a purported arbitration agreement). 
 6. This question arises with some frequency.  For example, in the arbitration context alone, 
the issue arose at least 136 times over a nine-year period, see infra Part III.C, or an average of over 
once a month. 
 7. Compare, e.g., Stewart v. Donges, 915 F.2d 572, 576 (10th Cir. 1990) (“[A]n 
interlocutory appeal from an order refusing to dismiss on double jeopardy or qualified immunity 
grounds . . . divests the district court of jurisdiction to proceed with any part of the action against an 
appealing defendant.”), Goshtasby v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., 123 F.3d 427, 428-29 (7th Cir. 
1997) (applying prior precedent that “when a public official takes an interlocutory appeal to assert a 
colorable claim to absolute or qualified immunity from damages, the district court must stay 
proceedings,” to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity claims), Princz, 998 F.2d at 1 (holding 
that district court could not proceed until appeal of denial of foreign state’s sovereign immunity 
claim resolved), and McCauley v. Halliburton Energy Servs. (McCauley I), 413 F.3d 1158, 1160 
(10th Cir. 2005) (“[U]pon the filing of a non-frivolous [interlocutory appeal of a refusal to enforce a 
purported arbitration agreement], the district court is divested of jurisdiction until the appeal is 
resolved on the merits.”), with McSurely v. McClellan, 697 F.2d 309, 317-18 (D.C. Cir. 1982) 
(denying request to stay litigation pending appeal of district court’s rejection of absolute and 
qualified immunity claims), McCue v. City of New York (In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site 
Litig.), 503 F.3d 167, 170-71 (2d Cir. 2007) (applying balancing test and concluding that pretrial 
proceedings could continue pending interlocutory appeal of district court’s denial of immunity 
claims), and Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 388 F.3d 39, 53 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that district 
court had jurisdiction to continue with case pending interlocutory appeal of motion to compel 
arbitration). 
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underlying merits litigation pending interlocutory appeal of its denial of 
the claimed right to avoid suit.8  Such an approach, however, is in 
tension with the fact that, as a whole, about 80% of district court 
decisions are ultimately affirmed.9  As just noted, if the district court was 
correct in holding that the defendant was not entitled to avoid suit, any 
stay pending interlocutory appeal of that determination unnecessarily 
delays the litigation.  This article explores this tension by examining in 
depth one category of interlocutory appeals of denials of a claimed right 
to avoid suit:  appeals of refusals to enforce a purported arbitration 
agreement. 
Section 16(a) of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)10 expressly 
provides for interlocutory appeals from a district court’s refusal to 
enforce a purported arbitration agreement.  However, it does not state 
whether the underlying litigation must be stayed pending appeal, and, as 
noted above, courts addressing the issue are split, with a majority 
holding that the district court may not proceed with the litigation.11  Part 
I of this article outlines and critiques current law on stays pending appeal 
of refusals to enforce purported arbitration agreements.  Part II proposes 
a simple analysis of expected error costs to determine whether to stay 
litigation pending interlocutory appeal of rejections of litigation-
avoidance claims.  This analysis looks to (1) potential harm to plaintiffs 
of erroneously staying litigation pending appeal, (2) potential harm to 
defendants of erroneously refusing to stay litigation pending appeal, and 
(3) the likelihood of each of those types of harms arising, which is based 
on the likelihood that the district court’s denial of the litigation-
avoidance claim is affirmed.  Part II then examines these factors through 
the lens of § 16(a) appeals of district courts’ refusals to enforce 
purported arbitration agreements and suggests that, while the potential 
harms to plaintiffs and defendants from erroneous stay decisions can be 
determined on a case-by-case basis by the district court, the likelihood of 
 
 8. See, e.g., Williams v. Brooks, 996 F.2d 728, 729-30 (5th Cir. 1993) (“A number of other 
circuits . . . have uniformly held that the filing of a non-frivolous notice of interlocutory appeal 
following a district court’s denial of a defendant’s immunity defense divests the district court of 
jurisdiction to proceed against that defendant.”); Gabriel Taran, Towards a Sensible Rule Governing 
Stays Pending Appeals of Denials of Arbitration, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 399, 413 (2006) (“[C]ircuits 
facing appeals from denials of double jeopardy claims generally mandate automatic issuance of 
stays of trial-level proceedings unless the appeal is found to be frivolous.”); infra notes 14-15 and 
accompanying text (noting majority position that litigation must be stayed pending interlocutory 
review of refusals to enforce purported arbitration agreements). 
 9. See infra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 10. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (West 2010). 
 11. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text; infra Part II. 
4
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affirmance is best determined on an aggregate level.  Part III reports the 
methodology and results of an analysis of § 16(a) appeals, finding an 
almost even split of affirmance and reversal.  This article concludes that 
based on the essentially even odds that a district court’s refusal to 
enforce a purported arbitration agreement will be affirmed, district 
courts should, at least in the arbitration context, simply engage in an 
unweighted balancing of the magnitude of potential harms to plaintiffs 
and defendants to determine whether a stay pending interlocutory appeal 
is warranted in any particular case.  The article closes by noting that 
while the results of this analysis are applicable only to appeals under the 
FAA, the analysis itself is applicable to other interlocutory appeals of 
rejected litigation-avoidance claims. 
II.  CURRENT LAW 
As noted above, section 16(a) of the FAA provides for immediate 
appeal of a federal district court’s refusal to enforce a purported 
arbitration agreement.12  While the FAA explicitly provides an exception 
to the final judgment rule for such an appeal, it does not specify whether 
litigation of the underlying substantive dispute may proceed while the 
interlocutory appeal is pending.13  As a result, the circuit courts are split 
as to whether litigation must be stayed pending an appeal of a district 
court’s refusal to enforce an arbitration agreement.  The Third, Seventh, 
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have all held that litigation in the district 
court must be stayed pending a § 16(a) appeal of the refusal to enforce a 
purported arbitration agreement.14  In contrast, the Second and Ninth 
Circuits have held that litigation may proceed while a refusal to enforce 
a purported arbitration agreement is on appeal, and that whether to stay 
 
 12. 9 U.S.C. § 16(a) (West 2010).  Note that, in contrast to a refusal to enforce a purported 
arbitration agreement, a district court’s enforcement of an arbitration agreement is not immediately 
appealable.  Id.  See also David D. Siegel, Practice Commentary, Appeals from Arbitrability 
Determinations, 9 U.S.C. § 16 (“[9 U.S.C. § 16(a)] is a pro-arbitration statute. . . . [It] explicitly 
allow[s] an immediate appeal from an anti-arbitration decision while precluding an appeal when the 
decision is in favor of arbitration.”). 
 13. See McCauley v. Halliburton Energy Servs. (McCauley I), 413 F.3d 1158, 1160 (10th Cir. 
2005) (“[The FAA] does not specify whether a motion to stay proceedings during an appeal should 
be granted.”). 
 14. See Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc., 482 F.3d 207, 215 n.6 (3d Cir. 2007); Bradford-
Scott Data Corp. v. Physician Computer Network, Inc. (Bradford-Scott I), 128 F.3d 504, 505-06 
(7th Cir. 1997); McCauley I, 413 F.3d at 1160; Blinco v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 366 F.3d 
1249, 1251 (11th Cir. 2004).  The D.C. Circuit has also applied this rule in an unpublished opinion.  
Bombardier Corp. v. Amtrak, No. 02-7125, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 25858, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 12, 
2002) (citing Bradford-Scott I). 
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the litigation pending the appeal is a matter within the district court’s 
discretion.15 
A. Courts Holding Litigation Must Be Stayed Pending Appeal 
Those courts holding that litigation must be stayed pending a § 
16(a) appeal base their argument on the principle of divestiture.  Under 
this principle, “[t]he filing of a notice of appeal is an event of 
jurisdictional significance—it confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals 
and divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case 
involved in the appeal.”16  This principle stems from the notion that a 
district court and an appellate court should not attempt to assert 
jurisdiction over a case simultaneously.17  The critical inquiry in 
applying the divestiture principle is determining which, if any, aspects of 
the case are not involved in the appeal, and thus remain subject to the 
jurisdiction of the district court.18  Circuit courts requiring an automatic 
stay of litigation while a § 16(a) appeal is pending assert that 
determination of the arbitrability of a dispute and litigation of its merits 
involve the same aspects of the case, and the district court is thus 
divested of jurisdiction to proceed with litigation of the merits while the 
appellate court is reviewing the arbitrability decision. For example, the 
Seventh Circuit has stated that “[w]hether the case should be litigated in 
the district court is not an issue collateral to the question presented by an 
appeal under § 16(a)(1)(A) . . . it is the mirror image of the question 
presented on appeal.”19 
 
 15. Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 388 F.3d 39, 53-54 (2d Cir. 2004); Britton v. Co-Op 
Banking Grp., 916 F.2d 1405, 1411-12 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 16. Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982). 
 17. Id. 
 18. See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n Local 19 v. Herre Bros., 198 F.3d 391, 394 
(3d Cir. 1999) (“Exceptions to the rule in Griggs allow the district court to retain jurisdiction to 
issue orders staying, modifying, or granting injunctive relief, to review applications for attorney’s 
fees, to direct the filing of supersedeas bonds, to correct clerical mistakes, and to issue orders 
affecting the record on appeal and the granting or vacating of bail.”). 
 19. Bradford-Scott Data Corp. v. Physician Computer Network, Inc. (Bradford-Scott I), 128 
F.3d 504, 505 (7th Cir. 1997).  See also id. at 506 (“An appeal authorized by § 16(a)(1)(A) presents 
the question whether the district court must stay its own proceedings pending arbitration.  Whether 
the litigation may go forward in the district court is precisely what the court of appeals must 
decide.”); Blinco v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 366 F.3d 1249, 1251 (11th Cir. 2004) (“The only 
aspect of the case involved in an appeal from an order denying a motion to compel arbitration is 
whether the case should be litigated at all in the district court.  The issue of continued litigation in 
the district court is not collateral to the question presented by an appeal under § 16(a)(1)(A); ‘it is 
the mirror image of the question presented on appeal.’”) (quoting Bradford-Scott I). 
6
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The main problem with this argument is that it is not at all clear that 
determination of the arbitrability of a dispute (the issue on appeal) 
involves the same aspects of the case as litigation of the substantive 
merits of the dispute (the issue remaining before the district court).  In 
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction, the 
Supreme Court stated that the issue of whether a certain dispute is 
arbitrable “is easily severable from the merits of the underlying 
dispute[].”20  Indeed, those circuits holding that district courts are not 
required to stay litigation of the merits pending a § 16(a) appeal rely on 
Moses H. Cone to support the proposition that determination of 
arbitrability by the appellate court and determination of the merits by the 
district court do not involve the same aspects of the case under the 
divestiture principle.21 
Given the lack of a clear answer as to whether litigation of the 
merits of a dispute in the district court involves the same aspects of the 
case as a pending § 16(a) appeal, courts applying the divestiture 
principle in this context turn to consideration of other factors for support.  
This is entirely appropriate, given the fact that, although couched in the 
language of jurisdiction, divestiture is a judge-made doctrine, not a rule 
of constitutional or statutory jurisdiction.22  Because it is a judge-made 
doctrine, the divestiture principle is not an absolute rule and should not 
be applied mechanically to the exclusion of prudential concerns.23  The 
two prudential concerns cited by courts requiring automatic stays of 
litigation pending a § 16(a) appeal are (1) the rights of parties to an 
 
 20. 460 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1983). 
 21. See Britton v. Co-Op Banking Grp., 916 F.2d 1405, 1412 & n.7 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Since 
the issue of arbitrability was the only substantive issue presented in this appeal, the district court 
was not divested of jurisdiction to proceed with the case on the merits.”) (citing Moses H. Cone); 
Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 388 F.3d 39, 54 (2d Cir. 2004) (“We . . . explicitly adopt the Ninth 
Circuit’s position [in Britton] that further district court proceedings in a case are not ‘involved in’ 
the appeal of an order refusing arbitration, and that a district court therefore has jurisdiction to 
proceed with a case absent a stay from this Court.”).  See also Taran, supra note 8, at 412 
(concluding that “the view more consistent with Supreme Court precedent holds that the district 
court is not divested of jurisdiction by the filing of an appeal of a denial of arbitration”). 
 22. McCauley v. Halliburton Energy Servs. (McCauley I), 413 F.3d 1158, 1162 n.1 (10th Cir. 
2005) (quoting 20 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 303.32[1] (3d ed. 
1999)) (“We note that we are not talking about constitutional or statutory jurisdiction, but rather ‘a 
judge-made doctrine, designed to promote judicial economy and avoid . . . confusion and 
inefficiency.’”). 
 23. 20 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 303.32[1] (3d ed. 1999) 
(“Although the general rule should ordinarily be followed, courts have noted that it is not absolute, 
nor always desirable.”); id. § 303.32[2][B][III] (“These cases recognize that restrictions on the power 
of the district court that are grounded in nothing more than the technical consideration that 
jurisdiction ‘passes’ when a notice of appeal is filed are impractical and unwise.”). 
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arbitration agreement not to be subjected to litigation and (2) general 
principles of efficiency. 
For example, with respect to a right not to be subjected to litigation, 
in holding that district courts are divested of jurisdiction while a § 16(a) 
appeal is pending, the Tenth Circuit explained that the failure to stay 
litigation pending such an interlocutory appeal “results in a denial or 
impairment of the appellant’s ability to obtain its legal entitlement to 
avoidance of litigation.”24  The Eleventh Circuit has likewise noted in 
explaining why district court litigation should be stayed pending a § 
16(a) appeal that “[t]he arbitrability of a dispute . . . gives the party 
moving to enforce an arbitration provision a right not to litigate the 
dispute in a court and bear the associated burdens.”25 
In addition to a right not to be subject to litigation, the other 
prudential concern cited in support of divesting the district court of 
jurisdiction over the underlying substantive dispute pending a § 16(a) 
appeal is one of efficiency.  As the Seventh Circuit has argued: 
Arbitration clauses reflect the parties’ preference for non-judicial 
dispute resolution, which may be faster and cheaper.  These benefits 
are eroded, and may be lost or even turned into net losses, if it is 
necessary to proceed in both judicial and arbitral forums, or to do this 
sequentially.  The worst possible outcome would be to litigate the 
dispute, to have the court of appeals reverse and order the dispute 
arbitrated, to arbitrate the dispute, and finally to return to court to have 
the award enforced.  Immediate appeal under § 16(a) helps to cut the 
loss from duplication.  Yet combining the costs of litigation and 
arbitration is what lies in store if a district court continues with the case 
while an appeal under § 16(a) is pending.  Cases of this kind are 
therefore poor candidates for exceptions to the [divestiture principle].26 
 
 24. McCauley I, 413 F.3d at 1162. 
 25. Blinco v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 366 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 26. Bradford-Scott Data Corp. v. Physician Computer Network, Inc. (Bradford-Scott I), 128 
F.3d 504, 506 (7th Cir. 1997).  See also Blinco, 366 F.3d at 1251 (“If the court of appeals reverses 
and orders the dispute arbitrated, then the costs of the litigation in the district court incurred during 
appellate review have been wasted and the parties must begin again in arbitration.”); McCauley I, 
413 F.3d at 1162 (quoting Bradford-Scott I).  See also Hardin v. First Cash Fin. Servs., 465 F.3d 
470, 474 n.2 (10th Cir. 2006) (refusing to limit McCauley such that district courts would not be 
divested of jurisdiction over non-dispositive matters such as amendments to pleadings and 
discovery while a § 16(a) appeal is pending, stating that “[a]rbitration is an attempt to avoid 
unnecessary court costs; by keeping non-dispositive matters within the purview of the district court, 
the parties continue to face costs for which they did not bargain”).  Speed and cost, however, are not 
the only reasons why parties enter into arbitration agreements.  Other potential benefits of 
arbitration include specialized arbitrator expertise and tailored rules of evidence.  See Taran, supra 
note 8, at 416.  These benefits are not compromised by not staying litigation pending a § 16(a) 
8
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The problem with both of these prudential arguments—that 
litigation of the underlying substantive dispute must be stayed pending a 
§ 16(a) appeal in order to (1) avoid infringing on the parties’ right not to 
be subject to litigation and (2) avoid unnecessary duplicative 
proceedings—is that they only apply in the event that the district court is 
ultimately wrong about the non-arbitrability of the dispute.  If the district 
court is correct that the dispute is not subject to an enforceable 
arbitration agreement, there is no right of either party to avoid litigation 
and any litigation that occurred while the appeal was pending would not 
have been unnecessary and duplicative.  To the contrary, it is any delay 
resulting from a stay of the merits litigation pending appeal that would 
have been unnecessary.  Those courts applying the divestiture principle 
in this context and requiring stays pending § 16(a) appeals seem to 
assume the validity of the alleged arbitration agreement, which is exactly 
the issue on appeal.  For example, the Seventh Circuit’s statement that 
“combining the costs of litigation and arbitration is what lies in store if a 
district court continues with the case while an appeal under § 16(a) is 
pending”27 is true only if, contrary to the district court’s holding, the 
dispute is indeed subject to an enforceable arbitration agreement. 
This myopic view is evidenced by those courts’ reference to “the 
parties’ preference” for arbitration.28  Clearly there is no “parties’ 
preference” for arbitration when one of the parties is refusing to 
arbitrate, and it may be the case that such party never had a preference 
for arbitration.  For example, both commentators and Congress have 
noted that, particularly in the consumer and employment contexts, pre-
dispute arbitration agreements often do not truly reflect a preference for 
arbitration.29  Indeed, one study has found “little basis for believing that 
 
appeal, even if the district court’s determination of non-arbitrability is ultimately reversed.  See id. 
(“As long as the dispute eventually ends up in arbitration, those benefits will be realized.”). 
 27. Bradford-Scott I, 128 F.3d at 506. 
 28. Bradford-Scott I, 128 F.3d at 506 (“Arbitration clauses reflect the parties’ preference for 
non-judicial dispute resolution, which may be faster and cheaper.”); McCauley I, 413 F.3d at 1162 
(same, quoting Bradford-Scott I). 
 29. See, e.g., Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer 
Contracts:  A Call for Reform, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1237, 1240 (2001) (“[T]he consumer rarely, if 
ever, chooses arbitration; pre-dispute arbitration is imposed upon the consumer by a contract of 
adhesion in which the consumer has no real choice.”); Margaret L. Moses, Privatized “Justice,” 36 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 535, 535 (2005) (“Although a party’s consent is supposed to be required in order 
for the dispute to be resolved in a private forum, in many consumer transactions, there is no willing 
and knowing consent to arbitration.”); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big 
Business:  Employee and Consumer Rights in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 
33, 108 (1997) (“[V]oluntariness is often presumed on the theory that the adherent is free to shop for 
better terms.  But that is only true if shopping is feasible; if all the firms in the market impose the 
same terms, shopping is impossible.  For example, private individual health insurance plans are not 
9
Perlstadt: Interlocutory Review of Litigation-Avoidance Claims
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2011
7_PERLSTADT_WESTERN 2.18.11.DOCM 2/22/2011  2:11 PM 
384 AKRON LAW REVIEW [44:375 
consumers are making informed decisions when they ‘agree’ to arbitrate 
in pre-dispute arbitration clauses.”30  It may be for just this reason that 
the district court refused to enforce the purported arbitration agreement 
in the first place.31 
This problem—that the prudential concerns justifying divestiture in 
the context of § 16(a) appeals are really only applicable where the 
district court was wrong in finding the dispute not arbitrable—is 
illustrated vividly by the Seventh and Tenth Circuit cases that first 
applied the divestiture principle in the § 16(a) context, Bradford-Scott 
Data Corp. v. Physician Computer Network, Inc. 32 and McCauley v. 
Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.33  Both Bradford-Scott and McCauley 
established the rule in their respective circuits requiring stays pending § 
16(a) appeals, making the prudential arguments about efficiency and the 
right to avoid litigation described above.34  In making those arguments, 
both cases seemed implicitly to assume (despite the district court’s 
holding to the contrary) that the disputes were indeed arbitrable.35  Yet in 
 
available without pre-dispute arbitration provisions.  Likewise, one cannot invest or obtain 
professional employment in the securities industry without stipulating to arbitration clauses.”); 
Celeste M. Hammond, A Real Estate Focus: The (Pre)(As)Sumed “Consent” of Commercial 
Binding Arbitration Contracts:  An Empirical Study of Attitudes and Expectations of Transactional 
Lawyers, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 589, 596 (2003) (“Where consumers, employees, and other 
unsophisticated persons are parties to contracts with businesses, especially where the terms of the 
contract are mandated by the business, the ‘voluntary nature’ of pre-dispute arbitration clauses is 
open to question.”); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931, 111th Congress (2009) (“The 
Congress finds the following: . . . Most consumers and employees have little or no meaningful 
option whether to submit their claims to arbitration.  Few people realize, or understand, the 
importance of deliberately fine print that strips them of rights, and because entire industries are 
adopting these clauses, people increasingly have no choice but to accept them.  They must often 
give up their rights as a condition of having a job, getting necessary medical care, buying a car, 
opening a bank account, getting a credit card, and the like.  Often times, they are not even aware 
that they have given up their rights.”); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Congress 
(2009) (same). 
 30. Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through 
Predispute Arbitration Clauses:  The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 55, 73 (2004) (noting that more than one third of pre-dispute arbitration clauses fail to 
inform consumers that they are waiving their right to litigate disputes in court, one fifth do not 
explicitly state that the outcome of arbitration is final and binding, more than one third fail to 
provide consumers with information regarding expenses they may incur in arbitration, almost one 
third fail to state what organization will provide the arbitration, and many are silent on issues such 
as arbitrator selection and the rules of discovery and evidence). 
 31. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., 298 F.3d 778, 783-84 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(affirming district court’s refusal to enforce arbitration agreement that was imposed as a non-
negotiable condition of employment). 
 32. 128 F.3d 504 (7th Cir. 1997) (Bradford-Scott I). 
 33. 413 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. 2005) (McCauley I). 
 34. Bradford-Scott I, 128 F.3d at 506; McCauley I, 413 F.3d at 1162. 
 35. See Bradford-Scott I, 128 F.3d at 504; McCauley I, 413 F.3d at 1162. 
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both cases, the decision of the district court finding the dispute at issue 
not subject to arbitration was ultimately upheld.  In Bradford-Scott, 
plaintiff filed a complaint in the district court based on a 1993 
agreement, which contained a narrow arbitration clause.36  Defendant 
moved to stay or dismiss the complaint pending arbitration, citing a 
broad arbitration clause in a 1988 agreement.37  The district court held 
that the parties were not required to arbitrate the dispute, and defendant 
filed a § 16(a) appeal.38  The district court further refused to stay 
discovery or trial pending the appeal.39  That ruling was then appealed, 
and it was in reversing that ruling and requiring that the underlying 
merits litigation be stayed pending the appeal that the Seventh Circuit 
laid out its rule applying the divestiture principle to § 16(a) appeals as 
discussed above.40  Nevertheless, in later addressing the issue as to 
whether the district court actually was correct in refusing to require the 
parties to arbitrate the dispute, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district 
court, holding that the broad arbitration clause of the 1988 agreement did 
not require arbitration of disputes arising under the 1993 agreement, 
whose narrow arbitration agreement did not apply to the dispute.41  Thus, 
the Seventh Circuit’s reliance in applying the divestiture principle to § 
16(a) appeals on “the parties’ preference” for arbitration and the 
supposed inefficiencies that follow from failing to stay litigation pending 
appeal if the district court is reversed42 was undermined by its later 
finding that the district court actually was correct in holding that the 
parties had not agreed to arbitrate the dispute at issue. 
The experience of the Tenth Circuit in McCauley is similar.  In that 
case, plaintiff McCauley worked for defendant Halliburton as a 
technician.43  McCauley also independently owned and operated 
McCauley Insulation as a sole proprietorship.44  Halliburton hired 
McCauley Insulation to spray one of Halliburton’s tanks, and McCauley 
was injured as he performed the work.45  When McCauley and his family 
 
 36. Bradford-Scott Data Corp. v. Physician Computer Network, Inc. (Bradford-Scott II), 136 
F.3d 1156, 1157 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 37. Id. at 1157-58. 
 38. Bradford-Scott I, 128 F.3d at 505. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Bradford-Scott I, 128 F.3d at 505-07. 
 41. Bradford-Scott II, 136 F.3d at 1158. 
 42. Bradford-Scott I, 128 F.3d at 506. 
 43. McCauley v. Halliburton Energy Servs. (McCauley II), No. 05-6011, 2005 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 29192, at *3 (10th Cir. Dec. 30, 2005). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
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sued Halliburton over the injury and Halliburton’s subsequent 
termination of McCauley, Halliburton moved to compel arbitration of all 
claims, alleging that the dispute was covered by a Halliburton dispute 
resolution program covering all employees.46  The district court granted 
the motion to compel arbitration of those claims relating to McCauley’s 
termination, but refused to compel arbitration of those claims relating to 
the injury, because those claims arose out of work McCauley was doing 
as an independent contractor, not as an employee subject to the dispute 
resolution program.47  Halliburton appealed the partial denial of its 
motion to compel arbitration under § 16(a) and moved to stay the district 
court litigation pending the appeal.48  As in Bradford-Scott, the court in 
McCauley initially held that the underlying district court litigation 
should be stayed pending the appeal, applying for the first time in that 
circuit the divestiture principle to § 16(a) appeals.49  Also like Bradford-
Scott, however, a subsequent opinion addressing the merits of the § 
16(a) appeal ultimately upheld the district court’s refusal to compel 
arbitration, agreeing that the claims unrelated to McCauley’s status as an 
employee were not covered by the Halliburton dispute resolution 
program.50  Again, this result undermines the supposed “parties’ 
preference” for arbitration, relied on in the earlier decision applying the 
divestiture principle to § 16(a) appeals.51 
What these two cases illustrate is a breakdown in the rule requiring 
an automatic stay of the underlying merits litigation pending a § 16(a) 
appeal.  Such a rule is premised on an argument that parties to an 
arbitration agreement should not be required to litigate a dispute that 
they have agreed to arbitrate, and that the worst possible outcome is one 
in which the dispute is litigated while the arbitrability decision is on 
appeal, followed by an appellate court reversal and order that the dispute 
instead be arbitrated.52  Bradford-Scott and McCauley represent a 
breakdown of this rule because the district court in each of these cases 
was ultimately vindicated and the disputes at issue were held by the 
 
 46. Id. at *3-4. 
 47. McCauley v. Halliburton Energy Servs. (McCauley I), 413 F.3d 1158, 1159 (10th Cir. 
2005). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 1160-62. 
 50. McCauley II, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 29192, at *17. 
 51. McCauley I, 413 F.3d at 1162 (citing Bradford-Scott I). 
 52. Bradford-Scott Data Corp. v. Physician Computer Network, Inc. (Bradford-Scott I), 128 
F.3d 504, 506 (7th Cir. 1997); McCauley I, 413 F.3d at 1161 (citing Bradford-Scott I). 
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appellate court not to be arbitrable.53  Any rights of the parties not to be 
forced to litigate the disputes would not have been harmed by not 
staying the litigation pending appeal because there were no such rights.  
Likewise, the party seeking arbitration would not have been harmed by 
unnecessary duplicative litigation while the interlocutory appeal was 
pending because such litigation was not unnecessary or duplicative.  
Indeed, to the extent any parties were harmed, it was the parties seeking 
to avoid arbitration and litigate their claims who were potentially harmed 
by the delay from postponing the litigation while the district court’s 
arbitrability decision was affirmed on appeal.54 
Basically, the more likely it is that the district court got it right that 
the substantive dispute at issue is not covered by a purported arbitration 
agreement, the less applicable the arguments in favor of staying 
litigation pending § 16(a) appeals become.  Those courts applying the 
divestiture principle to § 16(a) appeals seem to acknowledge this, at least 
to some extent, by creating an exception for frivolous appeals.  In those 
circuits, either the district or appellate court can declare the § 16(a) 
appeal frivolous, in which case, the district court litigation of the merits 
is not stayed.55  Thus, those courts hold that if the likelihood of affirming 
the district court’s refusal to compel arbitration surpasses some threshold 
(namely frivolousness of the appeal), the divestiture principle does not 
 
 53. Bradford-Scott Data Corp. v. Physician Computer Network, Inc. (Bradford-Scott II), 136 
F.3d 1156, 1158 (7th Cir. 1998); McCauley II, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 29192, at *18. 
 54. See infra Part II.B. 
 55. See Bradford-Scott I, 128 F.3d at 506 (“[A]ppellee may ask the court of appeals to dismiss 
the appeal as frivolous or to affirm summarily. . . .  Either the court of appeals or the district court 
may declare that the appeal is frivolous, and if it is the district court may carry on with the case.”); 
Blinco v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 366 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2004) (“When a litigant files 
a motion to stay litigation in the district court pending appeal from the denial of a motion to compel 
arbitration, the district court should stay the litigation so long as the appeal is non-frivolous.  If the 
district court denies the motion to stay, then the appellant may file a motion to stay in this Court.  If 
this Court then determines that the appeal is non-frivolous, then this Court should stay the litigation 
in the district court pending the appeal of the denial of the motion to compel arbitration.”); 
McCauley I, 413 F.3d at 1162 (“[U]pon the filing of a motion to stay litigation pending appeal from 
the denial of a motion to compel arbitration, the district court may frustrate any litigant’s attempt to 
exploit the categorical divestiture rule by taking the affirmative step, after a hearing, of certifying 
the § 16(a) appeal as frivolous or forfeited.  That certification will prevent the divestiture of district 
court jurisdiction.  Appellant may then move this court for a stay pending appeal, asserting that the 
district court’s finding of frivolousness is not supported by the record.  If this court determines that 
the appeal is not frivolous, we will stay the litigation in the district court pending the appeal of the 
denial of the motion to compel arbitration.”) (internal citations omitted); Ehleiter v. Grapetree 
Shores, Inc., 482 F.3d 207, 215 n.6 (3d Cir. 2007) (“In [a previous order] we expressed our 
agreement with the majority rule of automatic divestiture where the Section 16(a) appeal is neither 
frivolous nor forfeited.”) (emphasis added). 
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apply and litigation may continue in the district court.56  Frivolousness is 
an extremely high bar, however,57 and what these courts do not explain 
is why some threshold lower than frivolousness is not sufficient to allow 
litigation to proceed pending appeal.  The § 16(a) appeals in Bradford-
Scott and McCauley do not appear to have been frivolous; nevertheless, 
the district courts’ determinations of non-arbitrability were ultimately 
affirmed in those cases, and those courts requiring automatic stays of 
litigation pending § 16(a) appeals offer no suggestion as to why a 
standard (frivolousness) that results in errors such as those that occurred 
in Bradford-Scott and McCauley should be acceptable.58 
B. Courts Not Requiring Stay Pending Appeal 
In contrast to the Third, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, 
which have all held that district court litigation must be stayed pending 
an interlocutory § 16(a) appeal of a refusal to enforce an alleged 
arbitration agreement, the Second and Ninth Circuits in Motorola Credit 
Corp. v. Uzan59 and Britton v. Co-Op Banking Group,60 respectively, 
have held that the district court is not divested of jurisdiction while a § 
16(a) appeal is pending and may continue to litigate the substantive 
underlying dispute.61  Those cases rejecting application of the divestiture 
principle in this context do not require that the district court proceed 
with litigation while the § 16(a) appeal is pending, however; they hold 
 
 56. See Bradford-Scott I, 128 F.3d at 506; Blinco, 366 F.3d at 1253; McCauley I, 413 F.3d at 
1162; Ehleiter, 482 F.3d at 215. 
 57. See, e.g., Robert J. Martineau, Frivolous Appeals:  The Uncertain Federal Response, 1984 
DUKE L. J. 845 (1984) (explaining that federal courts find appeals frivolous where they are “utterly 
without merit” or have “no chance of success”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 113 (9th ed. 2009) 
(defining frivolous appeal as “[a]n appeal having no legal basis”). 
 58. Bradford Scott II, 136 F.3d 1156, 1158 (7th Cir. 1998); McCauley II, 2005 U.S. App. 
Lexis 29192, at *18. 
 59. 388 F.3d 39, 53-54 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 60. 916 F.2d 1405, 1411-12 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 61. The First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Federal Circuits do not appear to have directly 
addressed this question.  But see Combined Energies v. CCI, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 2d 142, 143 (D. Me. 
2007) (“Lummus [Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 273 F.2d 613 (1st Cir. 1959)] strongly 
suggests that a party should not be allowed to proceed with discovery when the other party has 
appealed an order denying arbitration.”); Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. Startec Global Comm. 
Corp., 303 B.R. 605, 608 (D. Md. 2004) (“The Fourth Circuit has not explicitly stated a position on 
whether an appeal from the denial of arbitration divests the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed.  It 
has, however, expressed a preference for a stay pending such an appeal.”) (citing Technosteel, LLC 
v. Beers Constr. Co., 271 F.3d 151 (4th Cir. 2001)).  As noted above, see supra note 14, the D.C. 
Circuit has endorsed the Seventh Circuit’s approach in an unpublished opinion.  Bombardier Corp. 
v. Amtrak, No. 02-7125, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 25858, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 12, 2002) (citing 
Bradford-Scott I). 
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only that it is within the discretion of the district court to decide.62  
Those decisions, however, provide little guidance to district courts on 
how to exercise such discretion.  The Ninth Circuit in Britton suggested 
only that district courts may decide to stay litigation pending a § 16(a) 
appeal if the claim for arbitration, which the district court has just 
rejected, “presents a substantial question.”63  The court failed to explain, 
however, what it means for a claim for arbitration to present a 
substantial question.  The Second Circuit in Motorola provided even less 
guidance to district courts as to how to exercise their discretion whether 
or not to stay litigation pending a § 16(a) appeal, stating only that it 
“explicitly adopt[ed]” the Ninth Circuit’s position in Britton, and that “a 
district court therefore has jurisdiction to proceed with a case absent a 
stay from [the Second Circuit].”64 
In stating the “substantial question” standard, Britton cited two 
cases, Pearce v. E.F. Hutton Group65 and C.B.S. Employees Federal 
Credit Union v. Donaldson.66  District courts have subsequently looked 
to these cases in an attempt to understand how to exercise their 
discretion in determining whether to grant stays pending § 16(a) 
appeals.67  Pearce itself offers no analysis of the issue, simply noting 
that “[t]he District Court found that [defendant’s] arguments that 
[plaintiff’s] claims were subject to arbitration raised ‘issues . . . of first 
 
 62. Britton, 916 F.2d at 1412 (“The system created by the Federal Arbitration Act allows the 
district court to evaluate the merits of the movant’s claim [to enforce arbitration], and if, for 
instance, the court finds that the motion presents a substantial question, to stay the proceedings 
pending an appeal from its refusal to compel arbitration. . . . This is a proper subject for the exercise 
of discretion by the trial court.”); Motorola, 388 F.3d at 54 (adopting Ninth Circuit’s position in 
Britton, which it characterized as observing that “either the district court or the court of appeals 
may—but is not required to—stay the proceedings upon determining that the appeal presents a 
substantial question.”).  Despite the fact that staying litigation pending a § 16(a) appeal is not 
required in those circuits, it may be the case that a number of district courts are nonetheless 
exercising their discretion in favor of stays.  See Stiener v. Apple Computer, Inc., No. C 07-04486, 
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90335, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2008) (“[T]he Court finds almost every 
California district court to recently consider whether to stay a matter, pending appeal of an order 
denying a motion to compel arbitration, has issued a stay.”). 
 63. 916 F.2d at 1412. 
 64. 388 F.3d at 54. 
 65. 828 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 66. 716 F. Supp. 307 (W.D. Tenn. 1989). 
 67. See, e.g., Stiener, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90335, at *6 (“The Ninth Circuit did not define 
the term ‘substantial’ but instead cited to two cases, [Pearce and C.B.S. Employees].”); Bradberry v. 
T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. C 06-6567, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58801, at *3-5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 
2007) (“Britton refers to two cases which provide guidance as to how a trial court should exercise 
discretion regarding whether to grant a stay pending an appeal.”); Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 
No. 05cv1167, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88855, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2006) (analyzing Pearce 
and C.B.S. Employees in an effort to interpret Britton). 
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impression,’ and that [defendant] would suffer substantial harm if 
[plaintiff’s] action were not stayed pending appeal and the District Court 
was later reversed.”68  C.B.S. Employees, on the other hand, applied a 
four-factor test from the Supreme Court case of Hilton v. Braunskill69 
traditionally used to determine whether to stay a district court order 
pending appeal.70  These four factors are:  
(1) [W]hether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is 
likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be 
irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will 
substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and 
(4) [whether] public interest [favors a stay].71 
Based on Britton’s citation of C.B.S. Employees, some district 
courts have utilized the four-factor Hilton test when determining 
whether to stay litigation pending a § 16(a) appeal.72 
Unfortunately, application of the Hilton factors generally has been 
far from uniform.  One commentator has noted at least four different 
procedures that have been used by courts to weigh the various Hilton 
factors.73  This lack of uniformity may be due, at least in part, to the 
somewhat curious requirement of having a district court consider, under 
the first Hilton factor, whether the loser of a ruling it just made has a 
substantial likelihood of prevailing on an appeal of that ruling.  It is not 
at all clear how a party who has just lost on an issue before a district 
court is supposed to convince that court that it has a substantial 
 
 68. 828 F.2d at 829. 
 69. 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987). 
 70. 716 F. Supp. at 309-10.  See also Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1760 (2009) 
(describing the four-factor test from Hilton as “the ‘traditional’ one” for determining whether to stay 
district court orders pending appeal). 
 71. C.B.S. Employees, 716 F. Supp. at 309 (quoting Hilton, 481 U.S. at 776). 
 72. See, e.g., Winig v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, No. C-06-4297, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
83116, at *2 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2006) (“Although the Ninth Circuit did not expressly adopt the 
test set forth in C.B.S., this Court will discuss the four prongs of the C.B.S. test in determining 
whether to stay the instant action pending appeal.”); Triton Container Int’l Ltd. v. Baltic Shipping 
Co., No. 95-0427, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18924, at *3 (E.D. La. Dec. 20, 1995) (“[A]n appeal [of a 
denial of a motion to stay litigation pending arbitration] does not affect my jurisdiction to determine 
the remaining issues in this case [citing Britton].  I may, however, exercise discretion to stay this 
proceeding on the merits after considering the [Hilton] factors.”).  See also RA Invs. I, LLC v. 
Deutsche Bank A.G., No. 3:04-CV-1565-G, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9961, at *12-13 (N.D. Tex. 
May 20, 2005) (“To determine whether a stay should be granted pending [a § 16(a)] appeal, a court 
must consider [the four Hilton factors].”). 
 73. John Y. Gotanda, The Emerging Standards for Issuing Appellate Stays, 45 BAYLOR L. 
REV. 809, 819 (1993) (“In general, four procedures have been used to weigh the [Hilton] factors in 
deciding whether to grant the stay: (1) the sequential test; (2) two-alternative test; (3) balancing-of-
the-factors test; and (4) the two-tier sliding scale test.”). 
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likelihood of prevailing on the merits of that issue before the appellate 
court.74  Presumably, if the district court believes that party is likely to 
prevail on appeal, the court should have ruled in that party’s favor in the 
first place.75 
Finally, in contrast to those courts examining the Hilton factors, 
some district courts simply decide whether to stay litigation pending a § 
16(a) appeal with little, if any, discussion of the standards guiding such a 
determination.76 
C. Summary of Current Law 
Current law on determining whether litigation of a dispute should 
be stayed or should proceed pending a § 16(a) interlocutory appeal of a 
refusal to enforce an arbitration agreement is clearly not uniform.  In 
those circuits applying the divestiture principle, the analysis is 
straightforward:  determine whether the appeal is frivolous, and if not, 
district court proceedings must be stayed pending appeal.  In those 
circuits that do not apply an automatic divestiture principle, district 
courts may either proceed with litigation of the underlying substantive 
dispute or stay proceedings pending the appeal, but they have been given 
little guidance on how to make such a determination, other than an 
oblique reference to the four-factor Hilton test. 
Despite the different analyses and conclusions, what all of these 
courts appear to be looking at is the potential harm to one side or the 
other from staying or not staying the pending litigation.  Whether 
through examination (by those courts applying the divestiture principle) 
 
 74. See, e.g., Avery v. Prelesnik, No. 1:04-CV-289, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 861, at *5 (W.D. 
Mich. Jan. 7, 2008) (“Respondent’s arguments concerning the merits of the appeal are the same as 
those rejected in the Court’s previous Opinion and Writ.  These arguments are no more convincing 
now than they were then.  Thus, the Court finds that Respondent has failed to make a strong 
showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits.”). 
 75. See infra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 76. See, e.g., Manigault v. Macy’s East, LLC, No. 06-CV-3337, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6101, 
at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2008) (declining to stay discovery pending appeal of refusal to compel 
arbitration because of apparent delay in calendaring appeal and because “whether this matter 
ultimately progresses before this Court or in an arbitral forum, information adduced through 
discovery will be useful to the litigants”); Denney v. Jenkins & Gilchrist, 362 F. Supp. 2d 407, 417-
18 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (lifting stay of litigation pending appeal of denial of motion to compel 
arbitration in light of new evidence making “the likelihood of success [on appeal] appear[] 
somewhat diminished”); Hill v. PeopleSoft USA, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 2d 559, 560-61 (D. Md. 2004) 
(noting that “the Court should evaluate prudential concerns” in order to determine whether to stay 
proceedings pending appeal of a refusal to compel arbitration, and holding that parties could amend 
pleadings and take discovery, but that court would not allow proceedings to reach trial stage or act 
on any motions for summary judgment while appeal was pending). 
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of “prudential concerns” such as efficiency and the right of a party to an 
arbitration agreement not to be subjected to litigation, or through 
application (by those courts not requiring an automatic stay) of the 
Hilton factors, what all of these courts are doing, without expressly 
saying so and with varying degrees of thoroughness and success, is 
looking at the costs associated with making an incorrect stay 
determination.  A more systematic method of examining error costs—
that is, the costs of staying litigation when there really is no valid 
agreement to arbitrate covering the dispute at issue, or not staying 
litigation when there is—would allow courts to perform this analysis 
more formally, openly, and consistently.  Part II proposes such an 
analysis, which is applicable not only to the § 16(a) appeals discussed 
here, but to interlocutory appeals of all denials of litigation-avoidance 
claims. 
III.  PROPOSAL 
Simplifying slightly,77 there are four possible outcomes when 
deciding whether to stay litigation pending interlocutory appeal of a 
denial of a claimed right to avoid suit:  (1) litigation is stayed pending 
the appeal and the district court’s finding that defendant is amenable to 
suit is affirmed, (2) litigation is stayed pending the appeal and the 
district court’s finding that defendant is amenable to suit is reversed, (3) 
litigation is not stayed pending the appeal and the district court’s finding 
that defendant is amenable to suit is affirmed, or (4) litigation is not 
stayed pending the appeal and the district court’s finding that defendant 
is amenable to suit is reversed.  The four scenarios can be summarized in 
the following 2 x 2 table: 
  
 
 77. See infra note 82. 
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 District Court Affirmed 
District Court  
Reversed 
Litigation 
Stayed 
Pending 
Appeal 
Scenario (1):   
Plaintiff bears cost of 
delay 
Scenario (2):   
No error cost 
Litigation 
Not Stayed 
Pending 
Appeal 
Scenario (3):  No error 
cost 
Scenario (4):  
Defendant bears cost of 
wrongful litigation 
 
In scenarios (2) and (3), the stay decision was the “right” one.  In 
scenario (2), where the district court was incorrect in refusing to 
recognize the defendant’s litigation-avoidance claim, the defendant was 
not amenable to suit, and thus having stayed the litigation pending 
appeal imposes no extra costs on either party because the litigation 
should never have proceeded.  There is no error cost because there was 
no error.  Likewise, in scenario (3), where the district court was correct 
in refusing to recognize the defendant’s litigation-avoidance claim, the 
defendant is indeed amenable to suit and not having stayed the litigation 
in that case similarly imposes no error costs on either party because the 
litigation must proceed.  Conversely, in scenarios (1) and (4), the stay 
decision was “wrong.”  In scenario (1), because the district court 
correctly refused to recognize a litigation-avoidance defense, defendant 
is properly subject to suit and a stay delays proper litigation of the 
dispute.  As noted above, this is how Bradford-Scott and McCauley 
ultimately played out.78  Likewise, in scenario (4), because the district 
court incorrectly refused to recognize a litigation-avoidance claim, a 
failure to have stayed the litigation pending appeal forced litigation (at 
least during the period while on appeal) against a defendant that was not 
properly amenable to suit.  Both scenarios (1) and (4) potentially impose 
error costs on one of the parties:  in scenario (1) the plaintiff bears the 
cost of incorrectly delayed litigation, while in scenario (4) the defendant 
bears the cost of being incorrectly subjected to litigation.  In Bradford-
Scott and McCauley, the appellate courts seem to have assumed the 
 
 78. See supra text accompanying notes 32-51. 
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district courts were wrong in refusing to enforce the purported 
arbitration agreements and sought to avoid the costs associated with 
scenario (4).79  In doing so, however, they ended up in scenario (1).80 
The expected harm for each scenario is the probability of that 
scenario occurring multiplied by the magnitude of harm arising out of 
that scenario.  To find the expected error costs associated with each of 
the two options (whether to stay or not to stay litigation pending 
interlocutory appeal), we add the expected harm from the two scenarios 
in each row corresponding to the two possible outcomes (affirmance or 
reversal of the district court’s rejection of the litigation-avoidance 
claim).  In other words, the expected error cost of staying litigation is the 
sum of the expected harm from Scenario (1) and Scenario (2), while the 
expected error cost of not staying litigation is the sum of the expected 
harm from Scenario (3) and Scenario (4).  Thus, if p is the probability 
that the district court’s rejection of the litigation-avoidance claim is 
affirmed, q the probability that the district court’s determination is 
reversed, HΠ the harm to plaintiff from delayed litigation based on an 
incorrect stay (Scenario (1)), and H∆ the harm to defendant in having to 
wrongfully continue litigation (Scenario (4)), then the expected error 
cost of staying litigation is pHΠ + q(0) and the expected error cost of not 
staying litigation is p(0) + qH∆.  If the goal is to minimize expected error 
cost,81 a simple comparison of these values suggests that litigation 
should be stayed where pHΠ < qH∆, and should not be stayed where pHΠ 
> qH∆.  Further, treating an appeal as a binary event resulting in either 
affirmance or reversal, q = (1-p).  Thus, litigation should be stayed 
pending interlocutory appeal of a district court’s rejection of a litigation-
avoidance claim where pHΠ < (1-p)H∆, and should not be stayed where 
pHΠ > (1-p)H∆.82 
 
 79. See Bradford-Scott Data Corp. v. Physician Computer Network, Inc. (Bradford-Scott I), 
128 F.3d 504, 506-07 (7th Cir. 1997); McCauley v. Halliburton Energy Servs. (McCauley I), 413 
F.3d 1158, 1162-63 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 80. See Bradford Scott II, 136 F.3d 1156 (7th Cir. 1998); McCauley II, No. 05-6011, 2005 
U.S. App. LEXIS 29192 (10th Cir. Dec. 30, 2005). 
 81. See generally Joshua P. Davis, Taking Uncertainty Seriously:  Revising Injunction 
Doctrine, 34 RUTGERS L. J. 363, 364 (2003) (noting that “scholars . . . have long recognized 
[minimizing expected error costs] as important in the design of our dispute resolution system”). 
 82. There are, of course, possible results other than affirmance or reversal, and treating q as 
equal to (1-p) is therefore an approximation.  In reporting statistics on merits terminations by the 
appellate courts, the Federal Judiciary categorizes merits terminations as “Affirmed/Enforced” 
(which includes cases affirmed in part and reversed in part), “Reversed,” “Dismissed,” 
“Remanded,” and “Other.”  See Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2001-2008, Table B-5,  
http://www.uscourts.gov/caseloadstatistics.html.  Nonetheless, categories other than 
“Affirmed/Enforced” and “Reversed” account for less than 10% of merits terminations.  See id.  
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One refinement of this model arises out of the fact that the district 
court could enter a partial stay pending the interlocutory appeal.  For 
example, the district court could allow some discovery to proceed while 
not allowing dispositive motions or trial.83  In such a situation, where the 
district court stays some aspects of the litigation but allows others to go 
forward, both sides face potential harms.  If the denial of the litigation-
avoidance claim is ultimately affirmed, then the plaintiff may suffer 
harm from the delay of the portions of the litigation that were stayed.  
Alternatively, if the denial of the litigation-avoidance claim is ultimately 
reversed, then the defendant may have incurred harm in being forced to 
litigate those aspects of the matter that were not stayed. 
After performing the initial error cost analysis described above to 
determine whether litigation should proceed or be stayed pending an 
interlocutory appeal, a second error cost analysis should be performed to 
determine whether some available partial stay would be preferable to 
either a complete stay or no stay at all.  If HΠ´ is the potential harm to 
plaintiff from a partial stay in the event that the matter is ultimately held 
by the appellate court to be subject to litigation and H∆´ is the harm to 
defendant from a partial stay where the district court’s rejection of the 
litigation-avoidance claim is ultimately reversed, then the expected error 
cost of issuing a partial stay is pHΠ´ + (1-p)H∆´, again, where p is the 
probability that the district court’s rejection of the litigation-avoidance 
claim is ultimately affirmed.  Thus, where no stay is warranted (because 
the expected error cost of not staying litigation is less than the expected 
error cost of completely staying litigation, that is, (1-p)H∆ < pHΠ), a 
partial stay is preferable to no stay where pHΠ´ + (1-p)H∆´ < (1-p)H∆.  In 
other words, a partial stay is preferable to no stay where a partial stay 
will lessen the potential harm to defendant from having to proceed with 
litigation should the district court’s rejection of the litigation-avoidance 
claim be reversed, so long as that reduced harm (multiplied by the 
 
Using a formula containing an approximation that disregards alternative outcomes that occur less 
than 10% of the time may not lead to mathematical certainty, but does not undermine its value as a 
useful analytic tool.  As one circuit court noted in applying an error cost formula in the context of 
explaining when a district court should grant a preliminary injunction, “[t]his formula . . . is 
intended not to force analysis into a quantitative straitjacket but to assist analysis by presenting 
succinctly the factors that the court must consider in making its decision and by articulating the 
relationship among the factors.”  Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hospital Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 
593 (7th Cir. 1986).  See also Villanova v. Abrams, 972 F.2d 792, 796 (7th Cir. 1992) (“An 
algebraic formulation of legal rules . . . has value in expressing rules compactly, in clarifying 
complex relationships, in identifying parallels between diverse legal doctrines, and in directing 
attention to relevant variables that might otherwise be overlooked.”). 
 83. See infra note 88 and accompanying text. 
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probability of reversal) is not outweighed by a corresponding increase in 
potential harm to plaintiff from a partial stay should the district court’s 
rejection of the litigation-avoidance claim be affirmed (multiplied by the 
probability of affirmance).  Likewise, where a complete stay is 
warranted (because pHΠ < (1-p)H∆), a partial stay is preferable where 
pHΠ´ + (1-p)H∆´ < pHΠ.  That is, a partial stay is preferable to a complete 
stay where a partial stay will lessen the potential harm to plaintiff from 
an erroneous delay of all litigation if such reduction in harm is not 
outweighed by the potential harm to defendant from having to proceed 
with some aspects of the litigation wrongfully (again, weighted by the 
probability of affirmance or reversal, respectively, of the district court’s 
rejection of the litigation-avoidance claim). 
Under the analysis proposed here, there are three relevant variables 
to examine in determining whether district court litigation should be 
stayed (either completely or partially) pending interlocutory appeal of a 
denial of a claimed right to avoid litigation:  (1) probability that the 
district court’s rejection of the litigation-avoidance claim will be 
affirmed on appeal (p), (2) harm to the plaintiff if litigation (or some 
portion of litigation) is incorrectly stayed (HΠ and HΠ´), and (3) harm to 
the defendant if litigation (or some portion of litigation) is incorrectly 
permitted to proceed (H∆ and H∆´).  The next three sections examine 
these variables (in reverse order) through the lens of § 16(a) appeals of 
refusals to enforce purported arbitration agreements.  
A. Harm from Incorrect Failure to Stay Litigation Pending Appeal 
The most obvious potential error cost, and the one on which those 
courts applying the divestiture principle focus,84 is the harm to a 
defendant from being forced to litigate a dispute that is properly the 
subject of arbitration between the time the district court refuses to 
enforce the arbitration agreement and the time the appellate court 
reverses that refusal.  As the Eleventh Circuit noted in endorsing the 
automatic stay rule, “[i]f the court of appeals reverses and orders the 
dispute arbitrated, then the costs of the litigation in the district court 
incurred during appellate review have been wasted and the parties must 
begin again in arbitration.”85 
 
 84. See supra text accompanying notes 23-26. 
 85. Blinco v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 366 F.3d 1249, 1251 (11th Cir. 2004).  See also 
Edith H. Jones, Appeals of Arbitration Orders—Coming out of the Serbonian Bog, 31 S. TEX. L. 
REV. 361, 375-76 (1990) (“[T]he expense and delay associated with preparation for trial would 
obviate the benefits of arbitration, producing a costly error should the district court’s refusal to 
enforce an arbitration agreement be reversed on appeal.”). 
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It is not necessarily the case, however, that all costs incurred in 
continued litigation while a § 16(a) appeal is pending are wasted if the 
district court’s decision is reversed and the case ultimately sent to 
arbitration.  For example, at least some discovery and information 
exchange between the parties occurs whether a dispute is arbitrated or 
litigated.86  Discovery taken in litigation while a § 16(a) appeal is 
pending would not have to be repeated should the dispute ultimately be 
sent to arbitration, and the costs associated with such discovery would 
not have been wasted, at least to the extent such discovery would have 
been performed in arbitration.87  Further, to the extent that other aspects 
of continued litigation may turn out to have been unnecessary and 
wasteful should arbitration ultimately be ordered, such as proceedings on 
class certification, proceedings on summary judgment motions, or 
ultimate trial, a complete stay of litigation is not necessary to avoid 
incurrence of those potential error costs, and a district court can issue a 
partial stay to limit such potential harms.88 
 
 86. See Theodore O. Rogers, Jr., The Procedural Differences Between Litigating in Court and 
Arbitration:  Who Benefits?, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 633, 634-35 (2001) (noting that while 
depositions are more limited in arbitration than in court, “[t]he scope of document discovery 
allowed by arbitrators is often as broad as in court, and sometimes more so”). 
 87. See Manigault v. Macy’s East, LLC, No. 06-CV-3337, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6101, at *2 
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2008) (“[W]hether this matter ultimately progresses before this Court or in an 
arbitral forum, information adduced through discovery will be useful to the litigants.”).  See also 
Bailey v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., No. 01-545, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14866, at *1-2 (D. Minn. 
Aug. 5, 2002) (refusing to stay litigation pending § 16(a) appeal, including discovery of information 
regarding persons similarly situated to plaintiffs, noting that the information was in all reasonable 
likelihood discoverable in either arbitration or litigation, and defendant therefore would suffer little, 
if any, prejudice in producing it). 
 88. See, e.g., Hill v. PeopleSoft USA, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 2d 559, 561 (D. Md. 2004) 
(“Although this Court will not issue a stay of all proceedings, it is mindful of the undesirable 
consequences of a ruling on the merits prior to a decision regarding arbitration by the higher court.  
Therefore, this Court will not permit the proceedings to reach the stage of a trial, nor will the Court 
act upon any motions for summary judgment.  The Court will, however, permit discovery to move 
forward and it will permit the parties to amend their pleadings.”) (internal citation omitted); 
Kaltwasser v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, No. C 07-00411, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68601, at *10 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2008) (“The parties may proceed with discovery, and [plaintiff] may file a 
motion for class certification.  However, [defendant] need not file opposition to that motion, and a 
briefing schedule will not be established, until the pending appeal [of a refusal to compel 
arbitration] has been decided.”).  See also Bradberry v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. C 06-6567, 2007 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58801, at *9-10 n.2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2007) (“[B]ecause Defendant’s motion to 
stay is denied without prejudice, it may move to stay when the trial date approaches.”).  But see 
Hardin v. First Cash Fin. Servs., 465 F.3d 470, 474 n.2 (10th Cir. 2006) (refusing to limit 
application of divestiture principle such that district courts would not be divested of jurisdiction 
over non-dispositive matters such as amendments to pleadings and discovery while a § 16(a) appeal 
is pending, and stating that “[a]rbitration is an attempt to avoid unnecessary court costs; by keeping 
non-dispositive matters within the purview of the district court, the parties continue to face costs for 
which they did not bargain”).  Note that this statement in Hardin again illustrates the unstated 
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The language used by some courts staying litigation pending appeal 
suggests that another harm resulting from an erroneous refusal to stay 
litigation pending a § 16(a) appeal is the loss of the benefit of speedy 
resolution of a dispute through arbitration.89  Putting aside the issue of 
whether arbitration truly offers a quicker resolution than litigation,90 
delayed resolution is not a cost imposed by an incorrect decision not to 
stay litigation pending a § 16(a) appeal.  Assuming the dispute at issue is 
arbitrable and the district court will be reversed on appeal, the arbitration 
will be delayed pending appeal regardless of whether litigation is stayed 
during the pendency of the appeal.  This is a cost of an error in the initial 
determination not to enforce the arbitration agreement, not in the 
subsequent decision whether to stay litigation pending a § 16(a) appeal 
of that determination. 
In any event, though perhaps overstated by some courts, and 
possibly redressable at least in part by a partial stay, there clearly may be 
potential harms to a defendant in any particular case who is forced to 
proceed with litigation while an appeal is pending to correct an 
erroneous determination of non-arbitrability.  The magnitude of such 
potential harms can be evaluated by a district court contemplating a stay 
on a case-by-case basis. 
B. Harm from Incorrect Stay of Litigation Pending Appeal 
On the other side of the equation are potential harms borne by a 
plaintiff where litigation of a dispute not subject to arbitration is delayed 
by a stay pending an interlocutory appeal of a district court’s correct 
 
assumption of the courts applying the automatic stay rule that the dispute is indeed subject to 
arbitration—a claim rejected by the district court and precisely the issue on appeal. 
 89. See, e.g., Bradford-Scott Data Corp. v. Physician Computer Network, Inc. (Bradford-Scott 
I), 128 F.3d 504, 506 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Arbitration clauses reflect the parties’ preference for non-
judicial dispute resolution, which may be faster and cheaper.  These benefits are eroded, and may be 
lost or even turned into net losses, if it is necessary to proceed in both judicial and arbitral forums, 
or to do this sequentially.”); Winig v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, No. C-06-4297, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 83116, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2006) (“[I]f a party must undergo the expense and delay of a 
trial before being able to appeal an order denying a motion to compel arbitration, the advantages of 
arbitration—speed and economy—are lost forever.”) (internal quotations and alterations omitted). 
 90. See David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1247, 1312 (2009) (“It is generally assumed that arbitration is faster and cheaper than litigation, but 
there is reason to believe that it is not. . . . [I]f one compares all case dispositions in the two 
forums—including settlements, pretrial dismissals, and the like—the average time to disposition 
may well be shorter in litigation than arbitration.”); Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)Build It, They Will 
Come:  Contracts to Remake the Rules of Litigation in Arbitration’s Image, 30 HARV. J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 579, 585 (2007) (noting that while the average time to resolve an arbitration is 16.5 months, 
the median time from filing a federal district court case to disposition is 9.5 months). 
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determination of non-arbitrability.  One such potential harm to plaintiff 
resulting from a delay in litigation is the effect on plaintiff’s ability to 
gather evidence, for example, from lessened availability of physical 
evidence and witness memory. 91  Another possible harm borne by a 
plaintiff whose litigation is erroneously stayed pending appeal is the cost 
of delayed relief or recovery to which the plaintiff might ultimately be 
entitled.92 
In addition to the actual plaintiff, third parties may be harmed if 
litigation is stayed while a § 16(a) appeal of an ultimately affirmed 
determination of non-arbitrability is pending.  For example, delayed 
resolution of a plaintiff’s claims seeking satisfaction of a debt can result 
in delayed resolution of third-party, lower-priority, creditors’ claims 
against the defendant.93  To the extent potential harms to nonparties exist 
 
 91. See, e.g., Ciolli v. Iravani, No. 2:08-cv-02601, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74514, at *9 (E.D. 
Pa. Sept. 23, 2008) (“[A]ny delay in litigation will have a subsequent effect on plaintiff’s ability to 
gather evidence as the passage of time inevitably impacts the availability of physical evidence and 
the sharpness of witness memories.”); Kaltwasser v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, No. C 07-00411, 2008 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68601, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2008) (denying motion to stay litigation 
pending appeal of refusal to compel arbitration, agreeing with plaintiff that “further delay of this 
action, which has been pending for over a year, will lead to a loss of evidence and ‘fading 
memories’”); Bradberry v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. C 06-6567, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58801, at 
*12 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2007) (citing risk of lost evidence as a harm to plaintiff weighing against 
staying litigation pending interlocutory appeal).  But see Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich, The 
Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of Limitation, 28 PAC. L.J. 453, 474 (1997) (citing a study finding that 
memory fades very rapidly after initial observation, but much more slowly thereafter, and 
suggesting that “[t]he difference in what is recalled between one year and four years . . . is 
comparatively slight”). 
 92. See, e.g., RA Investments I, LLC v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 3:04-CV-1565-G, 2005 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 9961, at *19-20 (N.D. Tex. May 20, 2005) (finding that plaintiffs, who alleged that 
defendants encouraged them to engage in an unsuccessful tax strategy, would suffer substantial 
harm if litigation were stayed pending defendants’ appeal of the court’s refusal to enforce an 
arbitration agreement, because plaintiffs were facing the possibility of paying millions of dollars in 
back-taxes, penalties, and interest to the IRS, and could face economic hardship if compensation 
from responsible parties were delayed); Ciolli, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74514, at *9 (“Any stay in 
this matter would delay plaintiff’s recovery, thereby perpetuating alleged falsehoods about the 
plaintiff, burdening plaintiff’s ability to seek employment, and temporarily withholding any 
monetary relief to which plaintiff may be entitled.”).  See also Perricone v. Unimed Nutritional 
Servs., No. 3:01CV512, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17613, at *9 (D. Conn. July 18, 2002) (“[A] stay 
[of patent infringement litigation pending USPTO reexamination of the patent] may continue to 
deprive the plaintiff, during the pendency of the reexamination, of the right to exclude others from 
making, using, offering to sell, or selling the patented invention.”). 
 93. See, e.g., Triton Container Int’l Ltd. v. Baltic Shipping Co., No. 95-0427, 1995 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 18924, at *5-6 (E.D. La. Dec. 20, 1995) (refusing to stay litigation pending § 16(a) appeal 
based on harm to third parties from stay, noting that “[s]ince it is doubtful that there are sufficient 
proceeds in the court’s registry to satisfy all claims asserted against [defendant], the claimants 
ranking below [plaintiff] would have difficulty obtaining disbursal of funds if [plaintiff’s] claim is 
left unresolved.”).  See also Bailey v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., No. 01-545, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
14866, at *2-3 (D. Minn. Aug. 5, 2002) (“[T]he issuance of a stay [pending § 16(a) appeal] and 
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from an erroneous decision whether to stay litigation pending a § 16(a) 
appeal, such harm can be added to HΠ or H∆ in the analysis as 
appropriate.94 
C. Probability That District Court’s Refusal to Enforce Arbitration 
Agreement Will Be Affirmed 
The purpose of pointing out the types of potential harms each side 
may incur from an erroneous stay decision is not to attempt to weigh or 
otherwise compare such harms on a general level.  Indeed, it is 
impossible to determine as a general matter what exactly the harms 
faced by each party from an erroneous stay decision are in any particular 
case; this determination is best made by the district court on a case-by-
case basis.  The point here is only to suggest that in any given case, there 
may be such potential harms to either side. 
In contrast to potential harms, however, which are best analyzed on 
a case-by-case basis, the likelihood of one side or the other incurring 
those harms—that is, the likelihood that the district court’s rejection of a 
litigation-avoidance defense will be affirmed or reversed—is not easily 
determined in any particular case by the presiding judge. 95  Presumably, 
any district court judge refusing to enforce a purported arbitration 
agreement believes it is not sufficiently likely that such a decision will 
be reversed on appeal; if the judge did so believe, he or she should have 
ruled the other way.96  In addition, judges, like all individuals, are 
 
further delay in production of the list in question [of employees similarly situated to plaintiffs] could 
substantially injure other parties interested in the case whose statute of limitations continues to  
run. . . .”). 
 94. See American Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Products Ltd., 780 F.2d 593, 601 (7th Cir. 
1986) (explaining how to incorporate public interest, i.e., potential harm to nonparties, in an error 
cost formula relating to injunctions). 
 95. But see Davis, supra note 81, at 424 (proposing a model for deciding whether to award 
injunctive relief that includes a judge’s “recogniz[ing] that she may err, and . . . provid[ing] a rough 
assessment of the likelihood that she has done so”). 
 96. See RA Investments I, LLC v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 3:04-CV-1565-G, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 9961, at *18 n.5 (N.D. Tex. May 20, 2005) (“[I]t is unlikely that a district court would ever 
be able to find that defendants will be likely to succeed on the merits of their appeal.  In order to 
make such a finding, this court would be admitting that it erred in denying defendant’s original 
motion to stay the proceedings [in favor of arbitration], and that the court of appeals is likely to 
reverse its decision.”) (internal citations omitted); Desktop Images, Inc. v. Ames, 930 F. Supp. 
1450, 1452 (D. Colo. 1996) (“Such a finding [that defendants are likely to succeed on an appeal] 
would have a rational basis only if the district court followed a precedent which it thought was 
clearly overdue for reversal by a court possessing the authority to reverse.”).  See also Stephen J. 
Choi, Mitu Gulati, & Eric A. Posner, What Do Federal District Judges Want?  An Analysis of 
Publications, Citations, and Reversals 3 (Jan. 5, 2009) (University of Chicago Working Paper 
Series), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1536723 (hypothesizing that “district judges care 
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susceptible to the egocentric bias of overestimating their own ability.97  
For example, nearly 88% of federal magistrate judges participating in 
one study believed that they were among the lower half of their peers in 
terms of reversal rates.98  Indeed, over 56% believed they were in the 
lowest quartile.99  Thus, there is no reason to believe that the best, or 
even a good, measure of the likelihood in any particular case that a 
judge’s refusal to enforce a purported arbitration agreement will be 
affirmed on appeal is that judge’s own assessment of that likelihood.  
Unlike potential harms, probability of affirmance cannot be examined on 
a case-by-case basis by the ruling district court judge, and should instead 
be looked at more generally.  This is the problem with the first factor of 
the Hilton test (likelihood of success on the merits),100 and why that test 
does not provide good guidance for determining whether to stay 
litigation pending a § 16(a) appeal.101 
In recent years, the general affirmance rate in federal private civil 
appeals has been almost 80%.102  Plugging 80% into our error cost 
comparison suggests that in order to justify a stay of litigation pending 
appeal, the harm to a defendant from litigation wrongfully proceeding 
 
about minimizing their workload and maximizing their reputation (and hopes for elevation to an 
appellate court) by avoiding appellate reversal”). 
 97. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi, & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 777, 814 (2001) (“The judges in our study exhibited a strong egocentric bias 
concerning the likelihood that they would be overturned on appeal.”). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See supra text accompanying notes 73-75. 
 101. But see Taran, supra note 8, at 419 (proposing that the four-factor Hilton test be adopted 
to govern the issuance of stays pending appeals of denials of arbitration).  It should also be noted 
that this problem applies only to district court determinations whether to stay litigation pending 
interlocutory appeal.  If the district court denies a stay, the appellate court may itself grant a stay.  
See FED. R. APP. P. 8(A).  The problems described above of a district court judge trying to determine 
the likelihood of its own decision being affirmed on appeal are not present when it is an appellate 
court trying to determine likelihood of affirmance.  In the case of an appellate court, it may be 
sufficient for the court to take a preliminary look at the merits of the appeal and decide likelihood of 
affirmance on a case-by-case basis, rather than by resort to generalized affirmance rates as this 
article suggests district courts should do. 
 102. This figure was determined by examining the Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics for 2001 
to 2008, supra note 82.  Table B-5 to each annual report provides statistics for appeals terminated 
on the merits for each U.S. Court of Appeal except the Federal Circuit for the twelve-month period 
ending March 31 of each year.  Id.  The percentage of total terminated appeals reported as 
“Affirmed/Enforced” (which includes merit terminations affirmed in part and reversed in part) in 
the 2001 through 2008 reports was 79.19%, with yearly rates during that period ranging from 
78.09% for the year ending March 31, 2003 to 80.06% for the year ending March 31, 2001.  Id.  
These were determined using data from proceedings reported as “other private civil,” which do not 
include prisoner petitions, bankruptcy appeals, administrative appeals, or original proceedings in the 
circuit court.  Id. 
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must be four times greater than the harm to a plaintiff from litigation 
wrongfully being delayed by a stay pending appeal.103  To more 
accurately compare expected error costs in the context of determining 
whether to stay litigation pending a § 16(a) appeal, however, the 
affirmance rate should be limited to such appeals.  Part III endeavors to 
determine that rate. 
IV.  METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
A terms and connectors search of “9 w/5 16(a)” for the years 2000 
through 2008 was conducted on the “US Courts of Appeals, Combined” 
database of Lexis.  The search returned 288 total cases.  All 288 cases 
were reviewed and assigned one of three codes:  Affirmed, Reversed, or 
Not Applicable.104 
A. Cases Coded Not Applicable 
The search was intended to be, and was, overbroad.  There are two 
ways in which a party can seek to enforce a purported arbitration 
agreement, sometimes referred to as embedded and non-embedded 
proceedings.105  This article is concerned only with the so-called 
embedded proceedings, in which the request to enforce a purported 
arbitration agreement is raised as a defense to pending litigation.  In 
contrast is the non-embedded proceeding, in which a party to an 
arbitration agreement seeks a court’s assistance to force a reluctant party 
to arbitrate in the absence, or independent, of any pending litigation.106  
Because there is no underlying litigation to stay or not stay pending an 
appeal of a refusal to enforce the purported arbitration agreement in a 
non-embedded proceeding, cases involving non-embedded proceedings 
are not relevant to the analysis here, and were consequently coded as 
Not Applicable. 
In addition, several of the cases returned did not involve 
interlocutory appeals of refusals to enforce purported arbitration 
 
 103. As explained above, supra text accompanying notes 81-82, a stay of litigation pending 
appeal is justified where pHΠ < (1-p)H∆, where p is the probability of affirmance on appeal, HΠ is 
the harm to a plaintiff from litigation wrongfully being delayed by appeal, and H∆ is the harm to a 
defendant from litigation wrongfully proceeding.  If p is 80%, a stay pending appeal is justified 
where .8HΠ < .2H∆, or 4HΠ < H∆.  
 104. A list of the 288 cases and the codes assigned appears at the end of this article as 
Appendix A. 
 105. See Siegel, supra note 12, at 495. 
 106. See, e.g., Watson Wyatt & Co. v. SBC Holdings, Inc., 513 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2008). 
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agreements at all, but rather appeals of orders compelling arbitration,107 
or appeals of orders confirming or vacating arbitration awards.108  
Finally, some individual cases that did in fact involve interlocutory 
appeals of refusals to enforce purported arbitration agreements in 
embedded proceedings were nonetheless coded as Not Applicable based 
on unique circumstances of those various cases.109  All in all, 152 of the 
288 cases were coded as Not Applicable.110 
B. Cases Coded Affirmed or Reversed 
Cases not coded as Not Applicable were coded as either Affirmed 
or Reversed.  As noted above,111 appellate court decisions can have 
outcomes other than affirmance or reversal, and thus do not always 
neatly fit into those two categories.  The results of the search performed 
here (that were not initially coded Not Applicable) could basically be 
divided into four groups: (1) cases in which the relevant district court 
ruling was affirmed, (2) cases in which the relevant district court ruling 
was reversed, (3) cases in which the relevant district court ruling was 
affirmed in part and reversed in part, and (4) cases in which the appeal 
was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.  As discussed more fully below, 
 
 107. See, e.g., 3M v. Amtex Sec., 542 F.3d 1193 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 108. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Inc. v. Clemente, No. 07-1021, 2008 US App LEXIS 6848 (3d 
Cir. Mar. 31, 2008); Beers Const. Co. v. Pikeville Hosp., No. 03-6264, 2005 US App LEXIS 7458 
(6th Cir. Apr. 28, 2005). 
 109. For example, in some cases, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s refusal to 
compel arbitration, but substantive merits litigation was nonetheless stayed for some prudential 
reason.  See, e.g., Ansari v. Qwest Commc’ns Corp., 414 F.3d 1214, 1216 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(affirming Colorado district court’s refusal to compel arbitration where agreement specified 
Washington D.C. as the site of arbitration, but staying litigation pending determination by D.C. 
court as to whether dispute was arbitrable); Hill v. G.E. Power Systems, Inc., 282 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 
2002) (refusing to compel arbitration where defendant was not a signatory to the relevant arbitration 
agreement, but holding that litigation should be stayed pending arbitration of claims against a co-
defendant who had signed the agreement).  Admittedly, some judgment was exercised in coding 
ostensibly applicable cases (interlocutory appeals of refusals to enforce arbitration agreements in 
embedded proceedings) as Not Applicable.  The guiding principle in determining such coding was 
whether there appeared to be pending litigation that would continue in the district court absent a 
stay pending the interlocutory appeal. 
 110. See Appendix A.  While the search was intended to be overinclusive, it is, of course, 
possible that the search was underinclusive as well.  For example, there may be cases in which an 
appellate court did not expressly invoke 9 U.S.C. § 16(a) when deciding an appeal under that 
section, or in which the appellate court referenced only 9 U.S.C. § 16 generally, but not § 16(a) 
specifically.  Such cases would not have been caught by the search here.  See, e.g., Price Plaintiffs v. 
Humana Ins. Co. (In re Humana Inc. Managed Care Litig.), 285 F.3d 971 (11th Cir. 2002) (no 
mention of bases of jurisdiction in appeal of order granting in part and denying in part motion to 
compel arbitration).   
 111. See supra note 82. 
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cases in the first and fourth groups were coded as Affirmed, cases in the 
second group were coded as Reversed, and cases in the third group were 
coded as either Affirmed or Reversed, depending on the circumstances.  
The touchstone in coding all of these cases was whether the appellate 
court decision meant that the underlying dispute on the merits would be 
litigated or arbitrated.  Because the objective of the analysis here was to 
compare the probability of incurring Scenario (1) error costs (plaintiff 
harmed by delay from an unnecessary stay) to the probability of 
incurring Scenario (4) error costs (defendant harmed by not staying 
litigation to which it should not have been subjected), the issue is 
whether staying litigation pending appeal would be a Scenario (1) error 
(because following the decision of the appellate court the substantive 
dispute is to be litigated) or not an error (because following the appeal 
the dispute is to be arbitrated), and conversely, whether refusing to stay 
litigation would be a Scenario (4) error (because following the appeal 
the dispute is to be arbitrated) or not an error (because following the 
appeal the dispute is to be litigated).  Those cases in which an erroneous 
stay decision would be a Scenario (1) error were coded as Affirmed, and 
those cases in which an erroneous stay decision would be a Scenario (4) 
error were coded as Reversed. 
C. Cases Affirming the District Court’s Ruling 
The first two categories of cases were the simplest to code.  If the 
appellate court affirmed the district court’s refusal to enforce a purported 
arbitration agreement, the underlying dispute would not be arbitrated.  In 
that case, staying litigation pending the appeal would have been a 
Scenario (1) error imposing potential error costs on the plaintiff, and not 
staying litigation pending the appeal would not have been an error.  This 
is true even if the appellate court affirmed on different grounds than the 
district court.  Consequently, all cases in which the district court’s 
refusal to enforce the purported arbitration agreement was affirmed, 
even if on different grounds, were coded as Affirmed. 
D. Cases Reversing the District Court’s Ruling 
Likewise, all cases in which the district court’s refusal to enforce a 
purported arbitration agreement was reversed were coded as Reversed.  
This included cases in which the appellate court reversed or vacated the 
district court’s ruling but remanded for consideration of other grounds 
that could potentially support the refusal to enforce the purported 
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agreement.112  Such cases were coded Reversed because absent the 
district court’s finding an alternative ground to refuse to enforce the 
purported arbitration agreement, reversal of the district court’s original 
refusal to compel arbitration means that the substantive underlying 
dispute should be arbitrated.  Consequently, a failure to stay litigation 
pending the appeal would impose Scenario (4) error costs on the party 
seeking to avoid litigation, while a stay of litigation would not have been 
an error.113 
E. Cases Affirming in Part and Reversing in Part the District Court’s 
Ruling 
In two of the otherwise applicable cases returned in the search, the 
district court’s refusal to enforce a purported arbitration agreement was 
essentially affirmed in part and reversed in part.  Thus, in Iberia Credit 
Bureau v. Cingular Wireless, LLC,114 after the district court denied 
motions to compel arbitration brought by three different defendants, the 
appellate court affirmed with respect to one defendant, and reversed with 
respect to the other two defendants.  Similarly, in Choice Hotels 
International, Inc. v. BSR Tropicana Resort, Inc.,115 after the district 
court held two claims non-arbitrable, the appellate court agreed that one 
claim was non-arbitrable, but held that the other claim was arbitrable.  
One way to code these cases would have been to treat each individual 
ruling separately and code each accordingly—that is, code Iberia Credit 
Bureau as two Affirmed and one Reversed, and Choice Hotels 
International as one Affirmed and one Reversed.  Such a coding system 
 
 112. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Comcast Corp., No. 06-4855, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 27617 (3d 
Cir. Nov. 30, 2007) (reversing district court holding that no arbitration agreement existed, but 
remanding to determine whether agreement was unconscionable contract of adhesion and whether 
dispute fell within scope of agreement); Zimmer v. CooperNeff Advisors, Inc., 523 F.3d 224 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (reversing district court’s holding that arbitration agreement was unconscionable, but 
remanding for further proceedings to determine whether employer had waived right to compel 
arbitration). 
 113. In the event the district court did, on remand, again deny a motion to compel arbitration 
based on alternative grounds, and that denial were appealed, the second appeal should also have 
shown up in the search and been counted independently.  See, e.g., Al-Safin v. Circuit City Stores, 
No. 00-35241, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19153 (9th Cir. Sept. 9, 2002) (reversing district court’s 
denial of motion to compel arbitration, finding arbitration agreement valid under federal law, but 
remanding for consideration of validity of arbitration agreement under state law); Al-Safin v. 
Circuit City Stores, 394 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming district court denial of motion to 
compel arbitration on remand, finding arbitration agreement unconscionable under state law).  Thus, 
the 2002 Al-Safin decision was coded as Reversed, and the 2005 Al-Safin decision was coded as 
Affirmed. 
 114. 379 F.3d 159 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 115. 252 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 2001). 
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was not used, however, in order to maintain consistency with the coding 
of other cases where individual rulings were not counted separately if all 
decided in the same way.116  Instead, Iberia Credit Bureau was coded as 
Reversed because the majority of the rulings were reversed, and Choice 
Hotels International was coded as Not Applicable because an equal 
number of the rulings were affirmed and reversed. 
F. Cases Dismissing the Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction 
In several of the cases, the appellate court held that it had no 
jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal of the district court’s refusal to 
compel arbitration.  There are several reasons why, despite § 16(a), an 
appellate court might find it has no jurisdiction over an interlocutory 
appeal of an order refusing to compel arbitration.117  Whatever the 
reason for the appellate court declining to exercise jurisdiction, however, 
the end result is that the district court’s refusal to enforce the purported 
arbitration agreement stands, and litigation of the underlying dispute 
therefore proceeds.  Thus, a stay of litigation pending the appeal 
(ultimately dismissed for lack of jurisdiction) would have imposed 
Scenario (1) error costs on the plaintiff, while a failure to stay litigation 
would not have been in error.  Thus, applicable cases in which the 
appellate court found that it did not have jurisdiction over a § 16(a) 
interlocutory appeal were coded Affirmed. 
G. Results 
Of the 288 cases returned in the search, 152 were ultimately coded 
as Not Applicable.118  Of the 136 applicable cases, 70 were coded as 
 
 116. See, e.g., In re NBR Antitrust Litig., No. 05-4535, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 27284 (3d Cir. 
Nov. 2, 2006) (reversing district court’s denial of motion to compel arbitration of three different 
claims).  NBR was coded as Reversed, but was not counted as three separate Reversed cases, even 
though the appellate court reversed the district court’s refusal to compel arbitration of three different 
claims. 
 117. For example, prior to the 2009 Supreme Court decision in Arthur Anderson LLP v. 
Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896 (2009), some circuit courts held that they did not have jurisdiction over 
appeals of orders denying motions to compel arbitration brought by non-signatories to the 
arbitration agreement at issue.  See Carlisle v. Curtis Mallet-Prevost, 521 F.3d 597 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(describing circuit split).  Another example where appellate jurisdiction may be lacking despite § 
16(a) is where the purported arbitration clause is part of a contract not covered by the FAA.  Seven-
Up/RC Bottling Co. v. Amalgamated Indust. Workers Union, No. 04-56051, 2006 U.S. App LEXIS 
14092 (9th Cir. June 5, 2006) (finding no jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a) to hear an appeal of an 
order denying a motion to compel arbitration because the FAA does not apply to employment 
contracts of interstate transportation workers). 
 118. See Appendix A. 
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Affirmed and 66 were coded as Reversed.119  Thus, of the applicable 
cases, 51.5% of appeals were Affirmed and 48.5% were Reversed, a 
roughly even split.120  In contrast to the 80% general overall affirmance 
rate, which suggested that litigation be stayed pending an interlocutory 
appeal where potential harm to a defendant from litigation wrongfully 
proceeding must be four times greater than potential harm to a plaintiff 
from litigation being stayed pending appeal,121 the essentially even 
probability of affirmance in the subset of § 16(a) interlocutory appeals 
suggests that litigation should be stayed simply when the magnitude of 
potential harm to a plaintiff from erroneously staying litigation is less 
than the magnitude of potential harm to a defendant from erroneously 
refusing to stay litigation, and vice versa.122  In either case, the district 
court should further consider the possibility of issuing a partial stay as an 
alternative to either a complete stay or no stay, and, given the essentially 
even odds of affirmance of the determination that the dispute is not 
arbitrable, the court need consider only the magnitude of the potential 
harm to each side when considering a partial stay.123 
 
 119. See id. 
 120. See id.  It should be noted that any selection effects of examining only appeals that 
resulted in a decision are likely minimal because cases once appealed appear unlikely to settle 
before an appellate court ruling.  See Samuel P. Jordan, Early Panel Announcement, Settlement, and 
Adjudication, 2007 BYU L. REV. 55, 69 n.54 (2007) (noting that decisions to settle after an appeal 
has been filed are anomalous); Daniel Kessler, Thomas Meites, & Geoffrey Miller, Explaining 
Deviations from the Fifty-Percent Rule:  A Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for 
Litigation, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 245 (1996) (suggesting that at the appellate stage, transaction 
costs of settling may exceed litigation costs because appeals involve questions of law that the parties 
have already briefed and argued in the trial court). 
 121. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text. 
 122. Technically, a 51.5% affirmance rate suggests that litigation should be stayed pending 
interlocutory appeal only if the potential harm to defendant in not staying litigation is more than 
1.06 times greater than the potential harm to plaintiffs in staying litigation.  The objective here is not 
mathematical precision, however, and clearly, trying to discern whether potential harm to one side is 
1.06 times greater than potential harm to another, as opposed to, say, .96 or 1.16 times greater, is not 
likely a fruitful endeavor for a district court to undertake.  However, it certainly seems possible for a 
district court to weigh the magnitudes of potential harms evenly and determine whether the 
magnitude of one potential harm is greater or lesser than the magnitude of some other potential 
harm. 
 123. As noted above, see supra text accompanying note 82, a partial stay is preferable to no 
stay where pHΠ´ + (1-p)H∆´ < (1-p)H∆ and is preferable to a complete stay where pHΠ´ + (1-
p)H∆´ < pHΠ.  Given that here, essentially, p = (1-p), a partial stay is preferable to no stay where 
HΠ´ + H∆´ < H∆, that is, where the harm to defendant from an erroneous holding that the dispute is 
not arbitrable can be lessened by a partial stay without causing harm to the plaintiff greater than the 
reduction in the defendant’s harm.  Likewise, a partial stay is preferable to a complete stay where 
HΠ´ + H∆´ < HΠ, that is, where the harm to plaintiff from delaying all litigation should the district 
court’s determination of non-arbitrability be affirmed can be lessened by a partial stay allowing 
some litigation to proceed without causing a correspondingly greater harm to defendant. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
A significant gap exists in the Federal Arbitration Act, which 
provides for interlocutory appeals of district court orders refusing to 
enforce purported arbitration agreements but fails to state whether 
litigation should be stayed pending such an appeal.  While all the courts 
addressing this lacuna appear to implicitly suggest avoiding error cost as 
a guiding principle, none of them apply that principle in a satisfactory 
manner.  Those circuits that allow district courts discretion whether to 
stay litigation pending a § 16(a) appeal fail to offer any meaningful 
guidance as to how to exercise such discretion.  Equally problematic is 
the approach of those circuits applying an automatic stay rule, which 
seems to be based on an assumption (shown here to be false) that the 
district court’s refusal to enforce a purported arbitration agreement is 
likely to be reversed.  Those courts seek to avoid what are described here 
as Scenario (4) errors at all costs, without considering the likelihood of 
incurring Scenario (1) errors.  As the ultimate outcomes of Bradford-
Scott and McCauley show, this approach can backfire. 
This article suggests that a more effective analysis of potential error 
costs look to three factors:  (1) potential harm to plaintiff if a stay of 
litigation pending an interlocutory appeal of a district court’s refusal to 
enforce a purported arbitration agreement turns out to have been 
erroneous, (2) potential harm to defendant if a failure to stay litigation 
pending an interlocutory appeal turns out to have been erroneous, and 
(3) the probability that the district court’s arbitrability determination will 
be affirmed on appeal.  Specifically, litigation should be stayed pending 
an interlocutory appeal when pHΠ < (1-p)H∆, where p is the probability 
of affirmance on appeal, HΠ the harm to a plaintiff from an erroneous 
stay, and H∆ the harm to a defendant from an erroneous failure to stay.124 
The potential harm to plaintiffs and defendants in any particular 
case can best be determined by the district court on a case-by-case basis.  
The likelihood that the district court will be affirmed on appeal, 
however, is best determined by looking at aggregate data.  In general, 
the affirmance rate of district courts has recently been around 80%, 
suggesting that litigation be stayed pending appeal only if the potential 
harm to the defendant in not staying litigation is more than four times 
greater than the potential harm to plaintiffs in staying litigation.  
Limiting the data to the subset of interlocutory appeals of refusals to 
enforce purported arbitration agreements, however, produces an 
 
 124. See id.  This article also suggests that a court further consider whether a partial stay would 
be preferable to either a complete stay or no stay at all based on the same three variables.  See id. 
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essentially 50/50 affirmance rate, suggesting that district courts should 
simply compare the magnitude of potential harm from erroneously 
staying litigation pending appeal to potential harm from erroneously 
refusing to stay litigation pending appeal.  Such an approach is easy to 
administer, and seems best suited to actually reducing the costs resulting 
from erroneous stay determinations. 
While this article focuses specifically on interlocutory appeals 
under the Federal Arbitration Act, there is no reason why the analysis 
proposed here would not be applicable more generally to interlocutory 
appeals of denials of other litigation-avoidance defenses such as 
absolute, qualified, or sovereign immunity, or double jeopardy.  The 
potential harms to one side or the other from an erroneous stay decision 
(or their magnitude) may be different than in the arbitration context, but 
the analysis presented here would be the same.  Those potential harms 
could be determined on a case-by-case basis, while an examination of 
affirmance rates in each of the other litigation-avoidance claim contexts 
would allow courts to perform the error cost analysis proposed here in 
those cases as well. 
  
35
Perlstadt: Interlocutory Review of Litigation-Avoidance Claims
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2011
7_PERLSTADT_WESTERN 2.18.11.DOCM 2/22/2011  2:11 PM 
410 AKRON LAW REVIEW [44:375 
APPENDIX A 
1mage Software, Inc. v. Reynolds & Reynolds Co., 459 F.3d 1044 
(10th Cir. 2006) (not applicable). 
2200 M St. LLC v. Murphy, No. 05-7035, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 
26081 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 2005) (affirmed). 
3M Co. v. Amtex Sec., Inc., 542 F.3d 1193 (8th Cir. 2008) (not 
applicable). 
Ace Capital RE Overseas Ltd. v. Cent. United Life Ins. Co., 307 
F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2002) (reversed). 
Aceros Prefabricados, S.A. v. Tradearbed, Inc., 282 F.3d 92 (2d 
Cir. 2002) (reversed). 
Adams v. Ga. Gulf. Corp., 237 F.3d 538 (5th Cir. 2001) (not 
applicable). 
Adams v. Monumental Gen. Cas. Co., 541 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 
2008) (not applicable). 
Adams v. Suozzi, 433 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2005) (affirmed). 
Advanced Bodycare Solutions, LLC v. Thione Int’l, Inc., 524 F.3d 
1235 (11th Cir. 2008) (affirmed). 
AgGrow Oils, L.L.C. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 
Pa., 242 F.3d 777 (8th Cir. 2001) (affirmed). 
Albert M. Higley Co. v. N/S Corp., 445 F.3d 861 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(affirmed). 
Alejandro v. L.S. Holding Inc., No. 04-2053, 2005 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 8270 (3d Cir. May 10, 2005) (not applicable). 
Aliron Int’l, Inc. v. Cherokee Nation Indus., Inc., 531 F.3d 863 
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (not applicable). 
Alpine Glass, Inc. v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 531 F.3d 679 (8th Cir. 
2008) (not applicable). 
Al-Safin v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 394 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(affirmed). 
Al-Safin v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., No. 00-35241, 2002 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 19153 (9th Cir. Sept. 9, 2002) (reversed). 
Alticor, Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 411 F.3d 669 (6th Cir. 
2005) (affirmed). 
Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 347 
F.3d 665 (7th Cir. 2003) (not applicable). 
Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Lang, 321 F.3d 533 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(not applicable). 
Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Orr, 294 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(not applicable). 
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Ansari v. Qwest Commc’ns Corp., 414 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(not applicable). 
Apache Bohai Corp. v. Texaco China, B.V., 330 F.3d 307 (5th Cir. 
2003) (not applicable). 
Arbercheski v. Oracle Corp., No. 06-3472, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 
6545 (2d Cir. Mar. 19, 2007) (reversed). 
Arciniaga v. Gen. Motors Corp., 460 F.3d 231 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(reversed). 
Arkcom Digital Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 289 F.3d 536 (8th Cir. 2002) 
(not applicable). 
Arrowhead Global Solutions, Inc. v. Datapath, Inc., No. 04-2000, 
2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 2786 (4th Cir. Feb. 3, 2006) (not applicable). 
Ass’n of Mex.-Am. Educators v. California, 231 F.3d 572 (9th Cir. 
2000) (not applicable). 
ATAC Corp. v. Arthur Treacher’s, Inc., 280 F.3d 1091 (6th Cir. 
2002) (not applicable). 
Bailey v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 346 F.3d 821 (8th Cir. 2003) 
(reversed). 
Bailey v. Fannie Mae, 209 F.3d 740 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (affirmed). 
Bank of N.S. v. Suitt Constr. Co., No. 05-3463, 2006 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 32100 (10th Cir. Dec. 28, 2006) (not applicable). 
Barnett v. Cigna Health Plan, No. 02-16460, 2003 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 15155 (9th Cir. July 25, 2003) (affirmed). 
Bates v. 84 Lumber Co., No. 04-6493, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 
23640 (6th Cir. Sept. 14, 2006) (not applicable). 
Beers Constr. Co. v. Pikeville United Methodist Hosp. of Ky., Inc., 
No. 03-6264, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 7458 (6th Cir. Apr. 28, 2005) (not 
applicable). 
Berenson v. Nat’l Fin. Servs. LLC, 485 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2007) (not 
applicable). 
Bess v. Check Express, 294 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2002) (reversed). 
Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595 (3d Cir. 2002) (not 
applicable). 
Blinco v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 366 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 
2004) (not applicable). 
Bloedorn v. Francisco Foods, Inc., 276 F.3d 270 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(not applicable). 
Bob Schultz Motors, Inc. v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 334 
F.3d 721 (8th Cir. 2003) (not applicable). 
Bogen Commc’ns, Inc. v. Tri-Signal Integration, Inc., No. 06-1987, 
2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 8605 (3d Cir. Apr. 13, 2007) (not applicable). 
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Bombardier Corp. v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 333 F.3d 250 
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (not applicable). 
Boomer v. AT & T Corp., 309 F.3d 404 (7th Cir. 2002) (reversed). 
Brandon, Jones, Sandall, Zeide, Kohn, Chalal & Musso, P.A. v. 
Medpartners, Inc., 312 F.3d 1349 (11th Cir. 2002) (not applicable). 
Brayman Constr. Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 622 (3d Cir. 
2003) (reversed). 
Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov’t of Turkm., 345 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(not applicable). 
Brown & Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 2000) 
(not applicable). 
Brown v. Pacific Life Ins. Co., 462 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2006) (not 
applicable). 
Bull HN Info. Sys., Inc. v. Hutson, 229 F.3d 321 (1st Cir. 2000) 
(not applicable). 
Burlington Ins. Co. v. Trygg-Hansa Ins. Co., No. 00-1373, 2001 
U.S. App. LEXIS 10625 (4th Cir. May 23, 2001) (reversed). 
Burlington Ins. Co. v. Trygg-Hansa Ins. Co., No. 01-2341, 2002 
U.S. App. LEXIS 18239 (4th Cir. Sept. 4, 2002) (not applicable). 
Burns v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 202 F.3d 616 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(affirmed). 
Bushley v. Credit Suisse First Bos., 360 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(not applicable). 
Campbell v. Gen. Dynamics Gov’t Sys. Corp., 407 F.3d 546 (1st 
Cir. 2005) (affirmed). 
Cap Gemini Ernst & Young, U.S., L.L.C. v. Nackel, 346 F.3d 360 
(2d Cir. 2003) (not applicable). 
Cargill Ferrous Int’l v. Highgate MV, No. 03-30042, 2003 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 14509 (5th Cir. July 18, 2003) (reversed). 
Cargill Ferrous Int’l v. Sea Phoenix MV, 325 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 
2003) (not applicable). 
Carlisle v. Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle, LLP, 521 F.3d 
597 (6th Cir. 2008) (affirmed). 
Cerveceria Cuauhtemoc Moctezuma S.A. de C.V. v. Montana 
Beverage Co., 330 F.3d 284 (5th Cir. 2003) (affirmed). 
Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., 207 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 
2000) (not applicable). 
Choice Hotels Int’l v. Patel, No. 05-1984, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 
13250 (4th Cir. June 7, 2007) (reversed). 
Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc. v. BSR Tropicana Resort, Inc., 252 F.3d 
707 (4th Cir. 2001) (not applicable). 
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Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(not applicable). 
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Mantor, 417 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(not applicable). 
Citifinancial Corp. v. Harrison, 453 F.3d 245 (5th Cir. 2006) (not 
applicable). 
Clarendon Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Kings Reins. Co., 241 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 
2001) (not applicable). 
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of N.Y. v. Soft Drink and Brewery 
Workers Union Local 812, 242 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2001) (not applicable). 
Colon v. R.K. Grace & Co., 358 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2003) (not 
applicable). 
Comanche Indian Tribe of Okla. v. 49, L.L.C., 391 F.3d 1129 (10th 
Cir. 2004) (not applicable). 
Combined Energies v. CCI, Inc., 514 F.3d 168 (1st Cir. 2008) 
(affirmed). 
Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 502 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 
2007) (not applicable). 
Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 514 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 
2008) (not applicable). 
Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 210 
F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2000) (not applicable). 
Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Staffing Concepts, Inc., No. 07-2475, 2008 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 667 (7th Cir. Jan. 11, 2008) (not applicable). 
Cook v. Erbey, 207 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2000) (not applicable). 
Cox v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 614 (8th Cir. 2007) (not applicable). 
Cox v. Ocean View Hotel Corp., 533 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(reversed). 
Cozza v. Network Assocs., Inc., 362 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(affirmed). 
CTF Hotel Holdings, Inc. v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 381 F.3d 131 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (affirmed). 
Cuie v. Nordstrom, Inc., No. 07-1114, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 
19356 (3d Cir. Aug. 14, 2007) (not applicable). 
Cummings v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 404 F.3d 1258 (10th 
Cir. 2005) (affirmed). 
Cunningham v. Fleetwood Homes of Ga., Inc., 253 F.3d 611 (11th 
Cir. 2001) (affirmed). 
Dahiya v. Talmidge Int’l, Ltd., 371 F.3d 207 (5th Cir. 2004) (not 
applicable). 
39
Perlstadt: Interlocutory Review of Litigation-Avoidance Claims
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2011
7_PERLSTADT_WESTERN 2.18.11.DOCM 2/22/2011  2:11 PM 
414 AKRON LAW REVIEW [44:375 
Dahiya v. Talmidge Int’l, Ltd., 380 F.3d 218 (5th Cir. 2004) (not 
applicable). 
Dambrosio v. Comcast Corp., No. 04-4330, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 
15690 (3d Cir. July 29, 2005) (reversed). 
Davis v. O’Melveny & Myers, 485 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2007) (not 
applicable). 
Dees v. Billy, 394 F.3d 1290 (9th Cir. 2005) (not applicable). 
Dieffenbach v. Int’l Rehab. Assocs., No. 04-4085, 2005 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 22405 (3d Cir. Oct. 18, 2005) (not applicable). 
DSMC Inc. v. Convera Corp., 349 F.3d 679 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 
(affirmed). 
Dynegy Midstream Servs., LP v. Trammochem, 451 F.3d 89 (2d 
Cir. 2006) (not applicable). 
Edwards v. Hovensa, LLC, 497 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 2007) (reversed). 
Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc., 482 F.3d 207 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(affirmed). 
Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau v. Bright Metal Specialties, Inc., 251 F.3d 
1316 (11th Cir. 2001) (not applicable). 
Empresa Constr. Contex Limitada v. Iseki, Inc., No. 00-56768, 
2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 2384 (9th Cir. Feb. 12, 2002) (not applicable). 
Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Woodmen of the World Life 
Ins. Soc’y, 479 F.3d 561 (8th Cir. 2007) (reversed). 
ExpoFrut S.A. v. M/V Aconcagua, No. 03-3205, 2004 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 20463 (3d Cir. Sept. 28, 2004) (not applicable). 
Express Scripts, Inc. v. Aegon Direct Mktg. Servs., Inc., 516 F.3d 
695 (8th Cir. 2008) (affirmed). 
Fairchild v. Nat’l Home Ins. Co., No. 99-16972, 2001 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 19487 (9th Cir. Aug. 28, 2001) (reversed). 
Fazio v. Lehman Bros., 340 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2003) (reversed). 
Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 
2002) (affirmed). 
Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2006) (not 
applicable). 
Fid. Fed. Bank, FSB, v. Durga MA Corp., 386 F.3d 1306 (9th Cir. 
2004) (not applicable). 
Fit Tech, Inc. v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp., 374 F.3d 1 (1st 
Cir. 2004) (affirmed). 
Franceschi v. Hosp. Gen. San Carlos, Inc., 420 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 
2005) (not applicable). 
Freudensprung v. Offshore Technical Servs., Inc., 379 F.3d 327 
(5th Cir. 2004) (not applicable). 
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Galey v. World Mktg. Alliance, 510 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(affirmed). 
Garbayo v. Chrome Data Corp., No. 02-35229, 2003 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 21264 (9th Cir. Oct. 20, 2003) (reversed). 
Garvey v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, No. 00-56080, 
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 31918 (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 2000) (not applicable). 
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Deutz AG, 270 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(affirmed). 
George v. LeBeau, 455 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2006) (not applicable). 
George v. LeBeau, No. 05-4241-cv, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 24029 
(2d Cir. July 10, 2006) (not applicable). 
Glazer v. Lehman Bros., 394 F.3d 444 (6th Cir. 2005) (reversed). 
Goins v. Ryan’s Family Steakhouses, Inc., No. 05-51549, 2006 
U.S. App. LEXIS 12471 (5th Cir. May 18, 2006) (affirmed). 
Graham v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 501 F.3d 1153 (10th 
Cir. 2007) (not applicable). 
Grain v. Trinity Health, 551 F.3d 374 (6th Cir. 2008) (not 
applicable). 
Great Earth Cos. v. Simons, 288 F.3d 878 (6th Cir. 2002) (not 
applicable). 
Green v. Ameritech Corp., 200 F.3d 967 (6th Cir. 2000) (not 
applicable). 
Greene v. Famous Pawn, Inc., No. 02-2263, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 
16672 (4th Cir. Aug. 14, 2003) (affirmed). 
Gulf Guar. Life Ins. Co. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 304 F.3d 476 
(5th Cir. 2002) (not applicable). 
Harden v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 249 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 
2001) (not applicable). 
Hardie v. United States, No. 05-5056, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 7305 
(Fed. Cir. Apr. 8, 2005) (not applicable). 
Hardin v. First Cash Fin. Servs., Inc., 465 F.3d 470 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(reversed). 
Harris Capital Fund, LLC v. Grillo, No. 05-3106, 2005 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 28721 (10th Cir. Dec. 23, 2005) (not applicable). 
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Swiss Reins. Am. Corp., 246 
F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2001) (not applicable). 
HCC Aviation Ins. Grp. v. Emp’rs. Reins. Corp., No. 05-11118, 
2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 15531 (5th Cir. June 28, 2007) (not applicable). 
Hemispherx Biopharma v. Johannesburg Consol. Invs., 553 F.3d 
1351 (11th Cir. 2008) (not applicable). 
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Hicks v. Bank of Am., No. 05-1399, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3984 
(10th Cir. Feb. 21, 2007) (not applicable). 
Higgs v. Auto. Warranty Corp. of Am., No. 03-4381, 2005 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 8688 (6th Cir. May 13, 2005) (reversed). 
Hightower v. GMRI, Inc., 272 F.3d 239 (4th Cir. 2001) (reversed). 
Hill v. G.E. Power Sys., Inc., 282 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 2002) (not 
applicable). 
Hill v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 398 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2005) (not 
applicable). 
HSM Constr. Servs. v. MDC Sys., No. 06-2584, 2007 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 16964 (3d Cir. July 16, 2007) (not applicable). 
Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159 
(5th Cir. 2004) (reversed). 
In re NBR Antitrust Litig., No. 05-4535, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 
27284 (3d Cir. Nov. 2, 2006) (reversed). 
In re Carefirst of Md., Inc., 305 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2002) (not 
applicable). 
In re Crysen/Monteney Energy Co., 226 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(not applicable). 
In re Gandy, 299 F.3d 489 (5th Cir. 2002) (affirmed). 
In re Mintze, 434 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 2006) (reversed). 
In re Tyco Int’l Ltd. Sec. Litig., 422 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 2005) 
(affirmed). 
In re Universal Serv. Fund Tel. Billing Practice Litig., 428 F.3d 
940 (10th Cir. 2005) (affirmed). 
In re White Mountain Mining Co., 403 F.3d 164 (4th Cir. 2005) 
(affirmed). 
Indus. Elec. Corp. of Wis. v. iPower Distrib. Grp., Inc., 215 F.3d 
677 (7th Cir. 2000) (affirmed). 
Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(affirmed). 
Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 408 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(affirmed). 
Inland Bulk Transfer Co. v. Cummins Engine Co., 332 F.3d 1007 
(6th Cir. 2003) (reversed). 
Int’l Assoc. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers Local Lodge 2121 
AFL-CIO v. Goodrich Corp., 410 F.3d 204 (5th Cir. 2005) (not 
applicable). 
Interactive Flight Techs., Inc. v. Swissair Swiss Air Trans. Co., 249 
F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2001) (not applicable). 
Intergen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134 (1st Cir. 2003) (affirmed). 
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Intertec Constr. A/S v. Turner Steiner Int’l, No. 00-7796, 2001 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 4156 (2d Cir. Mar. 16, 2001) (not applicable). 
Jackson v. Cintas Corp., 425 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2005) (not 
applicable). 
Javitch v. First Union Sec., Inc., 315 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(reversed). 
Jays Foods, L.L.C., v. Chem. & Allied Prod. Workers Union, Local 
20, AFL-CIO, 208 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 2000) (not applicable). 
Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Ga., LLC, 400 F.3d 868 
(11th Cir. 2005) (reversed). 
JLM Indus., Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(reversed). 
Johnson v. Gruma Corp., No. 03-55848, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 
2797 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 2005) (not applicable). 
Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(reversed). 
Jonesfilm v. Lions Gate Films, Inc., No. 03-7013, 2003 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 10915 (2d Cir. June 2, 2003) (not applicable). 
Kayne v. Thomas Kinkade Co., No. 07-11983, 2007 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 23585 (11th Cir. Oct. 3, 2007) (not applicable). 
Kee v. Mariner Health Care Mgmt. Co., No. 04-61092, 2005 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 21646 (5th Cir. Oct. 5, 2005) (not applicable). 
Keytrade USA, Inc. v. Ain Temouchent M/V, 404 F.3d 891 (5th 
Cir. 2005) (reversed). 
Kimberlin v. Renasant Bank, No. 07-6040, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 
20754 (6th Cir. Sept. 25, 2008) (affirmed). 
Klepper v. SLI, Inc., No. 01-2848, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 24695 
(3d Cir. May 28, 2002) (not applicable). 
Lambert v. Austin Ind., 544 F.3d 1192 (11th Cir. 2008) (reversed). 
Larry’s United Super, Inc. v. Werries, 253 F.3d 1083 (8th Cir. 
2001) (reversed). 
Las Vegas Sands, Inc. v. Culinary Workers’ Local Union No. 226, 
No. 01-15890, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 6052 (9th Cir. Apr. 2, 2002) 
(affirmed). 
Latuszewski v. Valic Fin. Advisors, Inc., No. 04-1324, 2005 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 11006 (3d Cir. June 9, 2005) (not applicable). 
Lewis v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 500 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 2007) 
(not applicable). 
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mandaree Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 36, 503 F.3d 
709 (8th Cir. 2007) (affirmed). 
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Lloyd v. Hovensa, LLC, 369 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2004) (not 
applicable). 
Lowden v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 512 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(affirmed). 
M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GMBH & Co., 326 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 
2003) (not applicable). 
Mactec, Inc. v. Gorelick, 427 F.3d 821 (10th Cir. 2005) (not 
applicable). 
Madol v. Dan Nelson Auto. Grp., 372 F.3d 997 (8th Cir. 2004) 
(reversed). 
Marie v. Allied Home Mortg. Corp., 402 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005) 
(reversed). 
Martin v. Teletech Holdings, Inc., No. 05-55342, 2006 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 31590 (9th Cir. Dec. 19, 2006) (reversed). 
May v. Higbee Co., 372 F.3d 757 (5th Cir. 2004) (reversed). 
MBNA Am. Bank v. Hill, 436 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2006) (reversed). 
McCaskill v. SCI Mgmt Corp., 285 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 2002) (not 
applicable). 
McCaskill v. SCI Mgmt. Corp., 298 F.3d 677 (7th Cir. 2001) (not 
applicable). 
McCauley v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 413 F.3d 1158 (10th 
Cir. 2005) (not applicable). 
McCauley v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., No. 05-6011, 2005 
U.S. App. LEXIS 29192 (10th Cir. Dec. 30, 2005) (affirmed). 
McKenzie v. SETA Corp., No. 99-1576, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 
31353 (4th Cir. Dec. 8, 2000) (not applicable). 
Medtronic Ave, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 367 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(reversed). 
Medtronic Ave, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 247 
F.3d 44 (3d Cir. 2001) (affirmed). 
Melton v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 01-35883, 2003 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 15316 (9th Cir. July 30, 2003) (reversed). 
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc. v. Clemente, No. 07-
1021, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 6848 (3d Cir. Mar. 31, 2008) (not 
applicable). 
Metro E. Ctr. for Conditioning & Health v. Qwest Comm. Int’l, 
Inc., 294 F.3d 924 (7th Cir. 2002) (reversed). 
Microchip Tech. Inc. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 367 F.3d 1350 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004) (affirmed). 
Microstrategy, Inc. v. Lauricia, 268 F.3d 244 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(reversed). 
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Minneapolis-St. Paul Mailers Union, Local No. 4 v. Nw. Publ’ns, 
Inc., 379 F.3d 502 (8th Cir. 2004) (not applicable). 
Mire v. Full Spectrum Lending, Inc., 389 F.3d 163 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(not applicable). 
Morales v. Sun Constructors, Inc., 541 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(reversed). 
Moran v. Ceiling Fans Direct, Inc., No. 06-20810, 2007 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 21421 (5th Cir. Sept. 6, 2007) (affirmed). 
Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(reversed). 
Municipality of San Juan v. Corp. para el Fomento Economico de 
la Ciudad Capital, 415 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2005) (not applicable). 
Murray v. United Food and Comm. Workers Int’l Union, 289 F.3d 
297 (4th Cir. 2002) (not applicable). 
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Expresstrak, L.L.C., 330 F.3d 523 
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (not applicable). 
Navajo Nation v. Peabody Holding Co., No. 02-7083, 2003 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 7879 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 23, 2003) (affirmed). 
Nova Plumbing, Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 330 F.3d 531 
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (not applicable). 
Oblix, Inc. v. Winiecki, 374 F.3d 488 (7th Cir. 2004) (reversed). 
Oil, Chem., & Atomic Workers Int’l Union v. Conoco, Inc., 241 
F.3d 1299 (10th Cir. 2001) (not applicable). 
Olick v. Dippel, No. 03-3093, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 5580 (3d Cir. 
Mar. 24, 2004) (not applicable). 
Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp. v. Bayer, No. 06-30372, 2007 U.S. App. 
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Cir. 2004) (not applicable). 
Richardson v. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 254 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 
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applicable). 
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(not applicable). 
Sandvik AB v. Advent Int’l Corp., 220 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 2000) 
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U.S. App. LEXIS 282 (3d Cir. Jan. 7, 2008) (not applicable). 
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Cir. 2007) (not applicable). 
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Skirchak v. Dynamics Research Corp., 508 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2007) 
(not applicable). 
Smith v. Steinkamp, 318 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirmed). 
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2002) (reversed). 
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LEXIS 13574 (5th Cir. May 31, 2006) (not applicable). 
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Stein v. KPMG, LLP, 486 F.3d 753 (2d Cir. 2007) (not applicable). 
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LEXIS 2751 (5th Cir. Feb. 7, 2008) (not applicable). 
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Stolt-Nielsen SA v. Celanese AG, 430 F.3d 567 (2d Cir. 2005) (not 
applicable). 
Stone v. Doerge, 328 F.3d 343 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirmed). 
Stutler v. T.K. Constructors Inc., 448 F.3d 343 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(reversed). 
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523 (8th Cir. 2006) (affirmed). 
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Cir. 2001) (reversed). 
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2001) (not applicable). 
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2004) (not applicable). 
Televisa S.A.DE C.V. v. DTVLA WC Inc., 366 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 
2004) (not applicable). 
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448 F.3d 760 (5th Cir. 2006) (not applicable). 
Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsys., Inc., No. 98-15545, 
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3311 (9th Cir. Mar. 2, 2000) (not applicable). 
Tittle v. Enron Corp., 463 F.3d 410 (5th Cir. 2006) (affirmed). 
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App. LEXIS 6156 (3d Cir. Mar. 24, 2008) (not applicable). 
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Unity Commuc’ns. Corp. v. Cingular Wireless, No. 06-60692, 2007 
U.S. App. LEXIS 27868 (5th Cir. Dec. 3, 2007) (affirmed). 
Valerio v. Crawford, 306 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2002) (not applicable). 
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No. 02-17279, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 201 (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 2004) (not 
applicable). 
Vetco Sales, Inc. v. Vinar, No. 03-10527, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 
1248 (5th Cir. Jan. 28, 2004) (affirmed). 
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Watson Wyatt & Co. v. SBC Holdings, Inc., 513 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 
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11588 (5th Cir. May 10, 2006) (not applicable). 
Wilson v. Am. Inv. Servs., No. 00-1528, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 
6409 (10th Cir. Apr. 5, 2002) (affirmed). 
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U.S. App. LEXIS 8441 (2d Cir. May 2, 2003) (reversed). 
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517 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2008) (affirmed). 
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U.S. App. LEXIS 12848 (4th Cir. June 25, 2003) (not applicable). 
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